The GIUK gap (sometimes written G-I-UK) is an area in the northern Atlantic Ocean that forms a naval choke point. Its name is an initialism for Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom, the gap being the two stretches of open ocean among these three landmasses. It separates the Norwegian Sea and the North Sea from the open Atlantic Ocean. The term is typically used in relation to military topics. The area has been considered strategically important since the beginning of the 20th century.
History Since the beginning of the 20th century, the exploitation of the GIUK gap by northern forces and measures to patrol and secure the gap by opposing forces have played an important role in naval and in overall military planning.
World War II From the start of World War II in 1939, German ships used the gap to break out from their bases in northern Germany (and from occupied Norway after April 1940) with a view to attacking Allied shipping convoys, but Allied blocking efforts in the North Sea and in the GIUK gap impeded such break-outs. British forces occupied the Faroe Islands in April 1940, and Iceland in May 1940; the United States took over effective control of Greenland in 1940. But the German Kriegsmarine profited greatly from the fall of France in June 1940, after which German submarines could operate from bases on the French coast. The origin of the term "gap" dates to this period, when there was a gap in air coverage known as the Mid-Atlantic gap or the "Greenland air gap". This gap was an area that land-based aircraft could not reach and where, as a result, they could not carry out their anti-submarine duties.
Cold War The GIUK gap again became the focus of naval planning in the 1950s, as it represented the only available outlet into the Atlantic Ocean for Soviet submarines operating from their bases on the Kola Peninsula. NATO worried that if the Cold War "turned hot", naval convoys reinforcing Europe from the U.S. would suffer unacceptable losses if Soviet submarines could operate in the North Atlantic. The United States and the United Kingdom based much of their post-war naval strategy on blocking the gap, installing a chain of underwater listening posts right across it during the 1950s – an example of a SOSUS "sound surveillance system". This deployment of sonar surveillance in the gap, and elsewhere, hampered the Soviet Northern Fleet's ability to deploy its submarines without detection. The Royal Navy's primary mission during the Cold War, excluding its nuclear deterrent role, involved anti-submarine warfare (ASW). The development of the Invincible-class ASW aircraft carriers stemmed from this doctrine: their primary mission involved anti-submarine warfare using Sea King helicopters. The Type 23 frigate originated as a pure ASW platform; its mission expanded following the Falklands War of 1982. The largest Russian submarine drills through the GIUK gap were operations Aport and Atrina, in 1985 and 1987, respectively, when the Soviets deployed several nuclear-powered general-purpose attack submarines (SSNs) near the U.S. coast before the 1985 Gorbachev–Reagan meeting. The Soviets planned to use the GIUK gap to intercept any NATO ships, especially aircraft carriers, heading towards the Soviet Union. Ships and submarines as well as Tupolev Tu-142 maritime-surveillance aircraft aimed to track any threatening ships. The advent of longer-ranged Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) allowed the Soviet Navy to deploy their ballistic missile submarine (SSBNs) within protected bastions in the Barents Sea and reduced their need to transit the GIUK gap. The much reduced, post-Cold War Russian Navy has even less need to transit the GIUK gap. Crossing the GIUK gap was a major strategic move for Ocean Venture in 1992, in which 84 NATO ships, including 4 US aircraft carriers, departed from their usual August exercise pattern, deployed a decoy south toward the mid-Atlantic, and then entered waters in a move that had historically been associated with a risk of destabilizing détente.
Post-Cold War In late October 2019, a week before Commander of the Northern Fleet Aleksandr Moiseyev and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met their Norwegian counterparts in Kirkenes, Norway, ten submarines of Russia's Northern Fleet, among them two diesel-electric and eight non-strategic nuclear, left their homebases in the Kola Peninsula to participate in submarine drills that were the largest, on the Russian side, since Cold War operations Aport and Atrina. The main task of the submarines was reportedly testing Russian ability to breach the GIUK gap undetected and sail into the Atlantic Ocean. The drills were expected to last up to two months.
Significance to Denmark Comprising Greenland, the Faroe Islands and Denmark, the Kingdom of Denmark is an Arctic state alongside seven other countries whose territories cover the Arctic region. All matters of foreign policy for both Greenland and the Faroe Islands fall within the jurisdiction of the Danish government. The Danish government has historically used its jurisdiction over foreign policy in both Greenland and the Faroe Islands to assist in securing the GIUK gap and the wider Arctic for its allies. In doing so, Denmark has arguably acquired a sense of goodwill from particularly the US government and NATO. The Danish government views the Arctic as a central component of its foreign security policy and will continue to expand its spending, surveillance and military presence in the region. Despite the relatively small-sized population of Denmark, roughly 6 million, the Danish government's close ties to Greenland and the Faroe Islands legitimises it as an inherently important Arctic actor on matters of geopolitical security and great-power tensions. Danish assertion of sovereignty in the GIUK gap and the wider Arctic is already a key concern to the Danish Realm and is expected to be an increasingly important component of Denmark's future responsibilities in NATO. The GIUK gap is also a key supply line between the US and its European allies. With war on-going in Ukraine, NATO and the US are showing renewed interest in the GIUK gap, positioning Denmark to be a key player in matters of broader European security and increasing the gap's strategic importance to the Danish Realm.
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