The Hannibal Directive (Hebrew: נוהל חניבעל, romanized: Nóhal Khanibaál), also translated as Hannibal Procedure or Hannibal Protocol, is the name of a controversial procedure used by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to prevent the capture of Israeli soldiers by enemy forces. Writer Eyal Weizman has stated that while the contents are still classified, "the following formulation, at the top of the directive, was made public: 'the kidnapping must be stopped by all means, even at the price of striking and harming our own forces.'" It was introduced in 1986, after a number of abductions of IDF soldiers in Lebanon and subsequent controversial prisoner exchanges. The full text of the directive was never published, and until 2003, Israeli military censorship forbade any discussion of the subject in the press. The directive has been changed several times, and in 2016, IDF Chief Of Staff Gadi Eisenkot ordered the formal revocation of the standing directive and the reformulation of the protocol. Two versions of the Hannibal Directive may have existed simultaneously at times: a written version, accessible only to the upper echelon of the IDF, and an "oral law" version for division commanders and lower levels. In the latter version, "by all means" was often interpreted literally, as in "an IDF soldier was 'better dead than abducted'". In 2011, IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz stated the directive does not permit killing IDF soldiers to prevent abduction. In the case of the abduction of Gilad Shalit, invocation of the Hannibal Directive occurred too late to have any influence on the course of events. Israeli newspapers including Haaretz, ABC News and the UN's Commission of Inquiry have reported that during the 7 October attacks the IDF ordered the Hannibal Directive to be used. The IDF was ordered to prevent "at all costs" the abduction of Israeli civilians or soldiers, possibly leading to the death of a large number of Israeli civilians.
Background Israel has, with several notable exceptions, adhered to the principle of not negotiating with those it considers terrorists, especially in hostage situations. This policy led to some notable successes, such as Operation Entebbe, but also to loss of human life, e.g. the Maalot Massacre. In cases where Israeli soldiers were captured and no military solution was found, Israel was forced to negotiate with the captors for an exchange of prisoners. Parts of the Israeli public would not accept abandoning captured soldiers to their fate. In 1970, a member of the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah) entered Israel from Lebanon and abducted a security guard in the northernmost Israeli town of Metula. He did this to secure a swap of the guard for a member of Fatah, jailed in Israel. In 1979, Israel agreed to exchange an Israeli POW held by Palestinians for 76 convicted Palestinian militants in Israeli jails. During the 1982 Lebanon War, Palestinian forces imprisoned nine IDF soldiers as POWs. Six were held by Fatah (the main faction of the PLO) and three by the pro-Syrian PFLP-GC. In 1983, Israel agreed to free 4,700 Palestinian and Lebanese prisoners, including several high ranking PLO officers, for the six IDF soldiers held captive by Fatah. The following year Israel agreed to free another 1,150 Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails. Many were allowed to remain in Israeli controlled territory.
The Hannibal Directive According to Haaretz reporter Leibovich-Dar, the motivation for the directive was the capture of two Israeli soldiers during a Hezbollah ambush in South Lebanon in June 1986. Both soldiers presumably died during the attack, and their bodies were returned to Israel in an exchange with Hezbollah in 1996. The directive developers were three top officers of the IDF Northern Command: Major General Yossi Peled, the command's operations officer; Colonel Gabi Ashkenazi; and the intelligence officer, Colonel Yaakov Amidror. The order was secret, and its existence was denied by Israeli military authorities. The exact wording of the directive was not known, though Leibovich-Dar claimed that it had been updated several times over the years. Anshel Pfeffer, writing in The Jerusalem Post, described the order in 2006 as the "rumored" standard procedure in the eventuality of a kidnap attempt: "soldiers are told, though never officially" the content of this order. Maariv quoted a version of the directive apparently applicable in 2014:
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![Hannibal Directive: Then-IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz (right) in a training exercise where the forces practiced a soldier abduction scenario. Addressing the IDF's operations forum, Gantz stated that IDF protocols do not allow for a soldier to be killed in order to prevent his abduction.[1]](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/10/Flickr_-_Israel_Defense_Forces_-_Chief_of_Staff_Lt._Gen._Benny_Gantz_Holds_a_Surprise_Training_Exercise_%283%29.jpg/1280px-Flickr_-_Israel_Defense_Forces_-_Chief_of_Staff_Lt._Gen._Benny_Gantz_Holds_a_Surprise_Training_Exercise_%283%29.jpg?utm_source=en.wikipedia.org&utm_campaign=parser&utm_content=thumbnail)

