Intelligence analysis is the application of individual and collective cognitive methods to weigh data and test hypotheses within a secret socio-cultural context. The descriptions are drawn from what may only be available in the form of deliberately deceptive information; the analyst must correlate the similarities among deceptions and extract a common truth. Although its practice is found in its purest form inside national intelligence agencies, its methods are also applicable in fields such as business intelligence or competitive intelligence.
Overview
Intelligence analysis is a way of reducing the ambiguity of highly ambiguous situations. Many analysts prefer the middle-of-the-road explanation, rejecting high or low probability explanations. Analysts may use their own standard of proportionality as to the risk acceptance of the opponent, rejecting that the opponent may take an extreme risk to achieve what the analyst regards as a minor gain. The analyst must avoid the special cognitive traps for intelligence analysis projecting what she or he wants the opponent to think, and using available information to justify that conclusion. Being aware that one's enemies may try to confuse is a relevant factor, especially in the areas of intelligence cycle security and its subdiscipline counterintelligence. During World War II, the German word for counterintelligence art was Funkspiel, or radio game—not a game in the sense of playing fields, but something that draws from game theory and seeks to confuse one's opponents. A set of problem-solving talents are essential for analysts. Since the other side may be hiding their intention, the analyst must be tolerant of ambiguity, of false leads, and of partial information far more fragmentary than faces the experimental scientist. According to Dick Heuer, in an experiment in which analyst behavior was studied, the process is one of incremental refinement: "with test subjects in the experiment demonstrating that initial exposure to blurred stimuli interferes with accurate perception even after more and better information becomes available...the experiment suggests that an analyst who starts observing a potential problem situation at an early and unclear stage is at a disadvantage as compared with others, such as policymakers, whose first exposure may come at a later stage when more and better information is available." The receipt of information in small increments over time also facilitates assimilation of this information into the analyst's existing views. One item of information may not be sufficient to prompt the analyst to change a previous view. The cumulative message inherent in many pieces of information may be significant but is attenuated when this information is not examined as a whole. The Intelligence Community's review of its performance before the 1973 Yom Kippur War noted [in the only declassified paragraph].
The problem of incremental analysis—especially as it applies to the current intelligence process—was also at work in the period preceding hostilities. Analysts, according to their own accounts, were often proceeding on the basis of the day's take, hastily comparing it with material received the previous day. They then produced in 'assembly line fashion' items which may have reflected perceptive intuition but which [did not] accrue from a systematic consideration of an accumulated body of integrated evidence. Writers on analysis have suggested reasons why analysts come to incorrect conclusions, by falling into cognitive traps for intelligence analysis. Without falling into the trap of avoiding decisions by wanting more information, analysts also need to recognize that they always can learn more about the opponent.
Analytic tradecraft
The body of specific methods for intelligence analysis is generally referred to as analytic tradecraft. The academic disciplines examining the art and science of intelligence analysis are most routinely referred to as "Intelligence Studies", and exemplified by institutions such as the Joint Military Intelligence College, University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public and International Affairs (Security and Intelligence Studies major), and Mercyhurst College Institute for Intelligence Studies. The goal of the Analytic Tradecraft Notes of the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Intelligence (DI) include the
Pursuit of expertise in analytic tradecraft is a central element of this plan. Our tradecraft enables analysts to provide "value-added" to consumers of intelligence by ensuring: Dedication to objectivity – tough-minded evaluation of information and explicit defense of judgments – which enhances our credibility with consumers dealing with complex and sensitive policy issues. Delivery of our products to the right people in time to be useful in their decision-making, and using feedback and tasking from them to drive the collection of the basic intelligence that we need to produce our analysis. Analytic tradecraft skills also serve as "force multipliers", helping us provide top-quality analysis:
The feedback our customers give us on our customized analysis clarifies for the analyst what questions most need answering. Employing rules for evaluating information and making judgments helps analysts manage the deluge of information, discern trends, and identify attempts at deception. Tradecraft standards can be used to iron out differences among experts who have complementary substantive specialties. Their interaction enhances teamwork, which allows the [Directorate of Intelligence] to be more productive.On January 2, 2015, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) issued Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203, which "establishe[d] Intelligence Community (IC) Analytic Standards that govern the production and evaluation of analytic products; articulates the responsibility of intelligence analysts to strive for excellence, integrity, and rigor in their analytic thinking and work practices..."
Setting goals for an intelligence analysis Stating the objective from the consumer's standpoint is an excellent starting point for goal-setting:
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