In criminal law, Intent is a subjective state of mind (mens rea) that must accompany the acts of certain crimes to constitute a violation. A more formal, generally synonymous legal term is scienter: intent or knowledge of wrongdoing.
Definitions Intent is defined in English law by the ruling in R v Mohan [1976] QB 1 as "the decision to bring about a prohibited consequence" (malum prohibitum). A range of words represents shades of intent in criminal laws around the world. The mental element, or mens rea, of murder, for example, was historically called malice aforethought. In some jurisdictions transferred intent allows the prosecution for intentional murder if a death occurs in the course of committing an intentional crime (see Felony murder rule). The intent for the other crime is transferred to the killing in this type of situation. The language of "malice" is mostly abandoned and intent element of a crime, such as intent to kill, may exist without a malicious motive, or even with a benevolent motive, such as in the case of euthanasia. A person intends a consequence when they 1) foresee that it will happen if their given series of acts or omissions continue, and 2) desire it to happen. The most serious level of culpability, justifying the most serious levels of punishment, is achieved when both these components are actually present in the accused's mind (a "subjective" test). A person who plans and executes a crime is considered, rightly or wrongly, a more serious danger to the public than one who acts spontaneously (perhaps because they are less likely to get caught), whether out of the sudden opportunity to steal, or out of anger to injure another. But intent can also come from the common law viewpoint as well.
The test of intent The policy issue for those who administer the criminal justice system is that, when planning their actions, people may be aware of many probable and possible consequences. So the decision to continue with the current plan means that all the foreseen consequences are to some extent intentional, i.e. within and not against the scope of each person's intent. For example, A, a jealous wife, discovers that her husband is having a sexual affair with B. Wishing only to drive B away from the neighbourhood, she goes to B's house one night, pours petrol on and sets fire to the front door. B dies in the resulting fire. A is shocked and horrified. It did not occur to her that B might be physically in danger and there was no conscious plan in her mind to injure B when the fire began. But when A's behaviour is analysed, B's death must be intentional. If A had genuinely wished to avoid any possibility of injury to B, she would not have started the fire. Or, if verbally warning B to leave was not an option, she should have waited until B was seen to leave the house before starting the fire. As it was, she waited until night when it was more likely that B would be at home and there would be fewer people around to raise the alarm. Whereas intent would be less if A had set fire to the house during the day after ringing the doorbell to check no one was home and then immediately ringing the fire brigade to report the fire. On a purely subjective basis, A intended to render B's house uninhabitable, so a reasonably substantial fire was required. The reasonable person would have foreseen a probability that people would be exposed to the risk of injury. Anyone in the house, neighbours, people passing by, and members of the fire service would all be in danger. The court therefore assesses the degree of probability that B or any other person might be in the house at that time of the night. The more certain the reasonable person would have been, the more justifiable it is to impute sufficient desire to convert what would otherwise only have been recklessness into intent to constitute the offence of murder. But if the degree of probability is lower, the court finds only recklessness proved. Some states once had a rule of felony murder: a death that occurred during commission of a felony automatically imputed sufficient mens rea for murder. This rule has been mostly abolished, and direct evidence of the required mental components is now required. Thus, the courts of most states use a hybrid test of intent, combining both subjective and objective elements, for each offence changed. For intention in English law, section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 provides the frame in which the mens rea is assessed. It states:
A court or jury, in determining whether a person has committed an offence,
Under s. 8(b) therefore, the jury is allowed a wide latitude in applying a hybrid test to impute intent or foresight (for the purposes of recklessness) on the basis of all the evidence. The United States Supreme Court held in Elonis v. United States that negligence is not sufficient to show intent, but did not rule on the question of recklessness.
Offences of basic and of specific intent In some states, a distinction is made between an offence of basic (sometimes termed "general") intent and an offence of specific intent.
At times a forensic psychiatric examination may be helpful in ascertaining the presence or absence of mens rea in crimes which require specific intent.
Direct intent and oblique intent
Direct intent: a person has direct intent when they intend a particular consequence of their act. Oblique intent: the person has oblique intent when the event is a natural consequence of a voluntary act and they foresee it as such. The 'natural consequence' definition was replaced in R v Woollin with the 'virtually certain' test. A person is now held to intend a consequence (obliquely) when that consequence is a virtually certain consequence of their action, and they knew it to be a virtually certain consequence. The first leg of this test has been condemned as unnecessary: a person should be held as intending a consequence if they believed it to be a virtually certain consequence, regardless of whether it was in fact virtually certain. This has two applications:
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