The Pathfinders were target-marking squadrons in RAF Bomber Command during World War II. They located and marked targets with flares, at which a main bomber force could aim, increasing the accuracy of their bombing. The Pathfinders were normally the first to receive new blind-bombing aids such as Gee, Oboe and the H2S radar. The early Pathfinder Force (PFF) squadrons were expanded to become a group, No. 8 (Pathfinder Force) Group, in January 1943. The initial Pathfinder Force was five squadrons, whilst No 8 Group ultimately grew to a strength of 19 squadrons. Whereas the majority of Pathfinder squadrons and personnel were from the Royal Air Force, the group also included No 405 Squadron of the Royal Canadian Air Force as well as many individual airmen from the air forces of other Commonwealth countries.
History
Background
At the start of the Second World War in September 1939 the doctrine of RAF Bomber Command was based on tight formations of heavily armed bombers attacking during daylight and fending off attacks by fighters with their guns. In early missions over France and the Low Countries there was no clear outcome regarding the success of the bombers' guns: the Luftwaffe lacked widespread radar so their interception efforts were disorganised. On 18 December 1939 a raid by three squadrons of Vickers Wellington against ships in the Heligoland Bight was detected on an experimental Freya radar long before it reached the target area. The British bomber force was met by German fighters that shot down 10 of the 22 bombers, with another two crashing in the sea and three more written off on landing. The Luftwaffe lost only two fighters in return. Although the causes for this disaster were debated it became clear that bomber forces could not defend themselves. Either bombing raids needed to have fighter escort, which was difficult given the limited range of the fighters, or attacks had to be made at night when the opponent's fighters could not see them. In the era before the widespread use of radar and the techniques needed to guide fighters to their targets with radar, night bombing would render the bombers vulnerable only if they were picked up by searchlights, a relatively rare occurrence. Offsetting the advantages of night bombing was the understanding that identifying the targets and attacking them accurately would be much more difficult. This meant a night bomber force was useful only against very large targets such as cities and was one of the reasons daylight bombing was considered. The Germans had also studied this problem and had invested considerable effort in radio navigation techniques to address it, demonstrating a standard of bombing accuracy during the night raids that daylight forces found difficult. The RAF lacked similar navigation systems, having ignored their development for a number of years and relied almost entirely on dead reckoning and optical instruments such as the Course Setting Bomb Sight. In limited visibility or when the target did not have a clearly distinguishing landmark, accurate bombing was very difficult. Bomber Command pressed ahead with a night bombing campaign starting in 1940. Bomber crews reported good results, turning for home if they lost their way or could not find the target because of the weather and pressing on only if they felt confident they could identify the target with certainty. However it was not long before reports started reaching the UK from observers on the ground that the bombers were never even heard over the targets let alone dropping their bombs nearby. At first these reports were dismissed but as other branches of the UK armed forces complained a report was commissioned. The result was the Butt Report of 18 August 1941, which noted that by the time the aircraft reached the Ruhr only one in 10 ever flew within 5 miles (8 km) of its target. Half of all the bombs carried into combat and dropped—many returned—fell in open country. Only one per cent of all the bombs were even in the vicinity of the target. Clearly something had to be done to address this or, as the other forces suggested, the strategic campaign should simply be dropped. Around this time Frederick Lindemann wrote an infamous report on dehousing, suggesting that the bomber force be directed against German urban areas, destroying as many houses as possible and thus rendering the German workforce unable to work well. Accepting the recommendations of Lindemann's report after intense debate, the British began planning a major offensive starting in the spring of 1942 with the aim of destroying German cities. By 1940 the British had started development of a number of night navigation aids and were already testing the Gee hyperbolic navigation system on operations. These would be available in quantity in early 1942, just as the heavy bombers, the Avro Lancaster and Handley Page Halifax, would be arriving in quantity. These technological developments dovetailed with the policy changes influenced by Lindemann's report.
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