Madhyamaka (Sanskrit: माध्यमक, romanized: Mādhyamaka, lit. 'middle way; centrism'; Chinese: 中觀見; pinyin: Zhōngguān jiàn; Vietnamese: Trung quán tông, chữ Nôm: 中觀宗; Tibetan: དབུ་མ་པ་, Wylie: dbu ma pa) also known as Madhyamika (Sanskrit: माध्यमिक, romanized: Mādhyamika) refers to a tradition of Buddhist philosophy and practice founded by the Indian Buddhist monk and philosopher Nāgārjuna (c. 150 – c. 250 CE). The foundational text of the Mādhyamaka tradition is Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā ("Root Verses on the Middle Way"). More broadly, Madhyamaka also refers to the ultimate nature of phenomena as well as the non-conceptual realization of ultimate reality that is experienced in meditation. Since the 4th century CE onwards, Madhyamaka philosophy had a major influence on the subsequent development of the Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition, especially following the spread of Buddhism throughout Asia. It is the dominant interpretation of Buddhist philosophy in Tibetan Buddhism and has also been influential in East Asian Buddhist thought. According to the classical Indian Madhyamika thinkers, all phenomena (dharmas) are empty (śūnya) of "nature", of any "substance" or "essence" (svabhāva) which could give them "solid and independent existence", because they are dependently co-arisen. But this "emptiness" itself is also "empty": it does not have an existence on its own, nor does it refer to a transcendental reality beyond or above phenomenal reality.
Etymology
Madhya is a Sanskrit word meaning "middle". The -ma suffix is a superlative, giving madhyama the meaning of "mid-most" or "medium". The -ka suffix is used to form adjectives, thus madhyamaka means "middling". The -ika suffix is used to form possessives, with a collective sense, thus mādhyamika mean "belonging to the mid-most" (the -ika suffix regularly causes a lengthening of the first vowel and elision of the final -a).
In a Buddhist context, these terms refer to the "middle path" (madhyamā pratipad), which refers to right view (samyagdṛṣṭi) which steers clear of the metaphysical extremes of annihilationism (ucchedavāda) and eternalism (śāsvatavāda). For example, the Sanskrit Kātyāyanasūtra states that though the world "relies on a duality of existence and non-existence", the Buddha teaches a correct view which understands that:Arising in the world, Kātyayana, seen and correctly understood just as it is, shows there is no non-existence in the world. Cessation in the world, Kātyāyana, seen and correctly understood just as it is, shows there is no permanent existence in the world. Thus avoiding both extremes the Tathāgata teaches a dharma by the middle path (madhyamayā pratipadā). That is: this being, that becomes; with the arising of this, that arises. With ignorance as condition there is volition ... [to be expanded with the standard formula of the 12 links of dependent origination]Though all Buddhist schools saw themselves as defending a middle path in accord with the Buddhist teachings, the name Madhyamaka refers to a school of Mahayana philosophy associated with Nāgārjuna and his commentators. The term Mādhyamika refers to adherents of the Madhyamaka school. Note that in both words the stress is on the first syllable.
Philosophical overview
Svabhāva, what Madhyamaka denies
Central to Madhyamaka philosophy is śūnyatā, "emptiness", which refers to the idea that dharmas are empty of svabhāva. This term has been translated variously as essence, intrinsic nature, inherent existence, own being, and substance. According to Richard P. Hayes, svabhāva can be interpreted as either "identity" or as "causal independence". Likewise, Westerhoff notes that svabhāva is a complex concept with both ontological and cognitive aspects. The ontological aspects include svabhāva as essence (a property which makes an object what it is) and as substance. As the Madhyamaka thinker Candrakīrti defines it, substance is something that does "not depend on anything else". It is substance-svabhāva, the objective and independent existence of any object or concept that the Madhyamaka arguments mostly focus on refuting. A common structure that Madhyamaka uses to negate svabhāva is the catuṣkoṭi ("four corners" or tetralemma), which consists of four alternatives: a proposition is true; a proposition is false; a proposition is both true and false; a proposition is neither true nor false. Some of the major topics discussed by classical Madhyamaka include causality, change, and personal identity. Madhyamaka's denial of svabhāva does not mean a nihilistic denial of all things, for in a conventional everyday sense, Madhyamaka does accept that one can speak of "things", and yet ultimately these things are empty of inherent existence. Furthermore, "emptiness" itself is also "empty": it does not have an existence on its own, nor does it refer to a transcendental reality beyond or above phenomenal reality. Svabhāva's cognitive aspect is merely a superimposition (samāropa) that beings make when they perceive and conceive of things. In this sense then, emptiness does not exist as some kind of primordial reality, but it is simply a corrective to a mistaken conception of how things exist. This idea of svabhāva that Madhyamaka denies is then not just a conceptual philosophical theory, but it is a cognitive distortion that beings automatically impose on the world, such as when we regard the five aggregates as constituting a single self. Candrakirti compares it to someone who suffers from vitreous floaters that cause the illusion of hairs appearing in their visual field. This cognitive dimension of svabhāva means that just understanding and assenting to Madhyamaka reasoning is not enough to end the suffering caused by our reification of the world, just like understanding how an optical illusion works does not make it stop functioning. What is required is a kind of cognitive shift (termed realization) in the way the world appears and therefore some kind of practice to lead to this shift. As Candrakirti says:
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