Massive retaliation

Massive retaliation is a military doctrine and nuclear strategy that commits a state to retaliate to an attack in much greater force, especially with the use of nuclear weapons. During the early stages of the Cold War, the New Look national security policy of the Eisenhower administration dictated that the United States threaten "its atomic capability and massive retaliatory striking power" to deter aggression from the Soviet Union. This strategy was seen as a cheaper alternative to maintaining a large conventional military, and cutting costs was a high priority for Eisenhower. Massive retaliation sparked controversy in a 1954 speech by John Foster Dulles implying that minor aggression could provoke the US into total nuclear war. While Eisenhower's foreign policy did frequently rely on the threat of nuclear retaliation, the phrase massive retaliation does not adequately describe his policies. Eisenhower deeply feared the prospect of nuclear war. He was resolute that even a limited nuclear war would invariably escalate to total nuclear war, with devastating global consequences. His objectives were to avoid that outcome, contain the threat of communism, and maintain a healthy domestic economy. Nevertheless, a widespread perception emerged that Eisenhower's policies were inflexible and incredible in the face of a growing communist threat. John F. Kennedy capitalized on this perception in his presidential campaign by championing a new strategy, flexible response, that would develop the US's ability to fight limited wars.

Background

After World War II, during the beginning of the Cold War, the Soviet Union grew in strength while Western Europe struggled to rebuild its economy and military. US President Harry S. Truman's overarching strategic goal was to contain or reverse the spread of totalitarian Soviet power. Towards this goal, the US implemented the Marshall Plan to help rebuild Europe, and joined the NATO alliance to protect it from Soviet aggression. The US was the only country with atomic weapons, from their invention until 1949, when the Soviet Union detonated its first. The need to deter this new threat was recognized in NSC 68, a national security policy paper written for the Truman administration in April 1950: "Only if we had overwhelming atomic superiority and obtained command of the air might the USSR be deterred from employing its atomic weapons as we progressed toward the fulfillment of our objectives." The top secret paper predicted that, by 1954, the Soviet Union would have sufficient atomic stockpiles and delivery methods to launch a devastating surprise attack on the US and its allies.

Strategy Massive retaliation is essentially a preemptive nuclear first strike. In the event of imminent attack from the Soviet Union, NATO forces would rapidly respond with strategic and tactical nuclear bombing in an effort to destroy Soviet nuclear forces before they left the ground. This strategy was summarized in MC 48, a strategy paper adopted by NATO in 1954: "Should war occur, the best defense against atomic attack lies in the ability of the Allied nations to reduce the threat at source by immediate and intensive atomic counter-attack." The aim of massive retaliation was to deter the Soviet Union from attacking Western Europe, which lacked enough conventional forces to counter the vast Soviet military. Deterrence requires that potential aggressors know what actions could invite retaliation, and they must believe that retaliation could cost them more than they stand to gain. They must also believe that if they avoid those actions, retaliation won't happen anyway. These are the same principles underlying mutual assured destruction. However, massive retaliation implies that even a minor conventional attack on a nuclear state could conceivably result in all-out nuclear retaliation. A closely related concept is brinkmanship, the practice of risking the escalation of conflict in order to gain some advantage.

History

The concept of massive retaliation became US policy with the approval of NSC 162/2 in October 1953 by US President Dwight D. Eisenhower. This policy paper was synthesized from three reports written under Project Solarium. It stated that, in order to defend against Soviet aggression, the US required "a strong military posture, with emphasis on the capability of inflicting massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power." Massive retaliation was part of Eisenhower's broader New Look national security policy, which attempted to balance a healthy economy with military strength. Military expenditures could be greatly reduced by relying more on nuclear weapons as a substitute for conventional military strength. The policy sparked public controversy in a speech by Eisenhower administration Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, on January 12, 1954:

We need allies and collective security. Our purpose is to make these relations more effective, less costly. This can be done by placing more reliance on deterrent power and less dependence on local defensive power. ... Local defense will always be important. But there is no local defense which alone will contain the mighty land power of the Communist world. Local defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power. A potential aggressor must know that he cannot always prescribe battle conditions that suit him. Although Dulles did not explicitly use the words massive retaliation, his speech created the impression that any amount of Soviet aggression might provoke the US into total nuclear war. The speech aroused feelings of anger and skepticism from both the American public and its allies. However, no decision was made by the Eisenhower administration to rely exclusively on the threat of strategic nuclear bombing, as demonstrated by its flexible responses to various crises such as in Indochina, the Taiwan Strait, Suez, and Lebanon. Eisenhower did not believe in "limited" nuclear war with the Soviet Union. He believed that any general war between the US and the Soviet Union would escalate to full-scale nuclear war. By 1955, both countries possessed hydrogen bombs vastly more destructive than earlier fission weapons. Eisenhower was very pessimistic about the potential results of nuclear war, having said in 1954, "Atomic war will destroy civilization. There will be millions of people dead. ... If the Kremlin and Washington ever lock up in a war, the results are too horrible to contemplate."

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