In the philosophy of mind, multiple realizability is the thesis that the same mental property, state, or event can be implemented by different physical properties, states, or events. Philosophers of mind have used multiple realizability to argue that mental states are not the same as—and cannot be reduced to—physical states. They have also used it to defend or criticize many versions of functionalism, especially machine-state functionalism.
Notion The multiple realizability thesis in the philosophy of mind posits that the same mental state can be realized by different physical states; another way of putting it is that there is a many-to-one mapping from physical states to mental states. Multiple realizability in general is not restricted to the multiple realizability of mental states. Many kinds of things can be realized by numerous physical devices. A wide variety of physical devices can serve as corkscrews, for example. Mental states can also be realized in a variety of ways. Just as the logical states of a Turing machine can be realized by different structural states in different mechanisms, so, by analogy, the mental states of a human being can be realized by different physical states in different individuals. Pain, for example, is correlated with different physical states of the nervous system in different organisms, but the organisms all experience the mental state of "being in pain." Mental states have been claimed to be multiply realizable not only across species and between individuals but also within individuals. At different times, the same individual may realize the same mental states in physically different forms. Neural plasticity—the fact that areas of the brain can assume the functions of other parts that have been damaged as the result of traumatic injury, pathology, natural biological development, or other processes—has long been considered to be an example. But so are more mundane facts about neurophysiology, such as the fact that neurons die and connections between them are rewired. The argument that neural plasticity supports multiple realizability has also been contested. Gualtiero Piccinini differentiates three related properties: variable realizability, multiple realizability, and medium independence.
A property is variably realizable if it can be instantiated by different realizers. For example, both a winged corkscrew and a waiter's corkscrew have the property of removing corks and do so through the same mechanism—a screw and pull mechanism. Because the mechanism is fundamentally unchanged, the property is variably realizable. For a property to be multiply realizable, the property must be able to be instantiated by different realizers and different mechanisms. The classic spring mousetrap and the glue mousetrap instantiate the same property, the ability to trap mice, but they do so through different mechanisms. As such, the property is multiply realizable. A property is medium independent if it can be instantiated by different realizers and different mechanisms and if the inputs and outputs of the mechanisms are also multiply realizable. A mousetrap is not medium independent; it must take a mouse as an input. A computer, though, is medium independent. A computer can be constructed from different parts assembled into different mechanisms and can take different types of inputs and outputs. In typical digital computers, the inputs and outputs are voltages, but in quantum computers, the inputs and outputs would be different.
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