The Battle of Jutland took place in the North Sea between the German High Seas Fleet and British Grand Fleet on the afternoon and evening of 31 May 1916, continuing sporadically through the night into the early hours of 1 June. The battle was the only direct engagement between the two fleets throughout World War I. The war had already been waged for two years without any major sea battle, and many of the people present did not expect that this patrol would end differently. Lack of experience still accounted for a number of mistakes by the combatants. The battle has been described in a number of phases, the last of which is the subject of this article.
Prelude The battle began when scouting battlecruiser forces of the two fleets met at around 1430 the first day. The British force of six battlecruisers and four fast battleships commanded by Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty gave chase to five German battlecruisers commanded by Vice-Admiral Franz Hipper. The German ships set course back towards where they knew the main German fleet was waiting, planning to lead the British ships into a trap. Despite his numerical disadvantage, Hipper succeed in sinking two British battlecruisers during the chase. Once the German fleet came in sight, the British ships reversed course, now intending to lead the German fleet in pursuit of them back towards the main British fleet. Despite minimal information, Admiral John Jellicoe managed to deploy his ships to good advantage across the path of the approaching German fleet, so that some success was gained in the short battle before the Germans in turn reversed course and withdrew. Vice-Admiral Reinhard Scheer was now in a difficult position, because his smaller force was cut off from Germany by the British fleet deployed across his escape route. He first attempted once again approaching the British positions, but was driven back. He then took up a position north west of the British, awaiting nightfall before making further attempts to escape. Jellicoe declined to give chase to the German fleet after the second encounter because of the limited daylight remaining. He feared that the difficulties spotting and identifying ships in darkness would nullify his numerical advantage over the Germans, but was also confident that his deployment would prevent the Germans escaping past him in the night, and battle could be resumed the following day in conditions to his advantage. His battleships were redeployed from their battle line into closed up night cruising formation, with the battlecruisers deployed to his south west to prevent Germans passing south, and destroyers deployed behind the main fleet to intercept Germans passing to the north. British ships had not trained for night action, but German ships had. The Germans had better searchlight control, using iris shutters which could rapidly switch on and off the light, star shell which could be fired over enemy ships to illuminate them without having to use a searchlight, which automatically presented a target for return fire. They used a system of coloured lights for recognition signals between ships, which the British could not duplicate, whereas the British used plain flashed morse signals, which the Germans were partly able to copy after once seeing them, giving some advantage when ships met. Scheer determined that his best chance was to pass the British fleet during the night.
German options Scheer had four main escape routes, which were known to both admirals. He could change course away from the British fleet to the north-east and take a route through the Skagerrak channel north of Jutland back to safety in the Baltic. Although this might avoid the British, it was the longest route and risked some of his damaged ships sinking before reaching harbour. Jellicoe discounted the route, because of these considerations but also because the other escape routes all lay to the south, and he could not guard both directions. The longer route might also allow his faster ships to catch up the following day should Scheer go that way. The next possibility was via a gap cleared through the middle of the minefields laid by both sides in the Heligoland Bight. Scheer had taken this route on the way out, but the uncertainties in knowing their precise position after the battle and locating the seaward end of the channel would make it risky as a return route. The third choice was around the minefields to the North Frisian coast and thence east to the River Ems and Jade. This was 180 nmi (330 km; 210 mi) but Jellicoe had a report of the German fleet heading west south west, which was the course for this route and it would take Scheer generally away from the British. Jellicoe believed this was the most likely route for the Germans to take, so set a course south at 17 kn (31 km/h; 20 mph), faster than the German ships could manage, which should put him in a position to locate and overtake the German fleet at daylight. The shortest route of 100 nmi (190 km; 120 mi) was via Horns Reef to the SSE, passing north of the minefields laid by both sides in the Heligoland Bight. It was this route which Scheer chose despite having to pass the British fleet. Although it was not Jellicoe's guess at Scheer's actions, he anticipated that the destroyers and cruisers spread out around his fleet would give warning should the Germans take this route and his general course would still allow him to intercept.
British deployment
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