science

On the Psychology of Military Incompetence

On the Psychology of Military Incompetence is a science topic covered in the lgStudy science library. This page brings together a partial reference excerpt, illustrations, worked examples, real-world applications and a short study plan, so you can understand On the Psychology of Military Incompetence rather than just read about it. In short: On The Psychology of Military Incompetence is a work by Norman F. Dixon, first published in 1976, which applies insights from psychology to military history.

Key takeaways

On the Psychology of Military Incompetence belongs to science; place it in that map before memorising details.
Learn the definition first, then one example that makes the definition concrete.
Connect On the Psychology of Military Incompetence to a quantity you can measure, compute or draw — that is where exam questions come from.
Reproduce the core statement of On the Psychology of Military Incompetence from memory before moving on to harder problems.

Reference excerpt

On The Psychology of Military Incompetence is a work by Norman F. Dixon, first published in 1976, which applies insights from psychology to military history. After case studies of military and naval disasters from the preceding 120 years, mostly British, it offers in readable, not technical, style and analysis of the personality of the unsuccessful leader. Its conclusions are equally applicable to other less deadly forms of human organisation.

Synopsis Starting from the premise that success or failure in military and naval operations may in large part be due to the personality of the general or admiral in command, the author first examines various historical disasters and the role of the commander in the resulting loss of life or liberty for the victims (which often included civilians as well). Among major British case studies, he cites the blunders in the Crimean War by Raglan, followed by the blunders of Buller in the Second Boer War. In the First World War, he looks at the casualty list of Haig on the Western Front and the ineptitude of Townshend in Mesopotamia. Between the wars he castigates Britain for its failure to modernise its forces, which led to years of disaster on land, sea and (less so) in the air. During the Second World War, he covers Percival's failure to defend Singapore and Montgomery's over-bold effort to seize Arnhem (though he sees this as a tragic blot on an otherwise laudable career). After this catalogue of incompetence, he addresses how such large and costly enterprises as armed forces can be put in the hands of men of such dubious calibre. Here he discerns a vicious circle: it is people of a certain type who are recruited and promoted, so others either do not apply or languish in insignificant positions. Among characteristics of the British officer class in the period under examination are: a narrow social segment admitted, scorn of intellectual and artistic endeavour, subservience to tradition, and emphasis on virility. This leads, in his view, to the prevalence of an authoritarian type, fawning to superiors and often harsh or uncaring to inferiors. Such a man, by this analysis, is afraid of women (so only half human) and afraid of failure. He therefore ignores people and facts which do not conform to his world view, learns little from experience and clings to external rules, applying them even when the situation demands other approaches (for example Haig sacrificing hundreds of thousands of men he ordered to walk through mud into German machine gun fire). He may not be stupid, though some of the generals studied undoubtedly were, and he may be physically courageous, but his fatal lack is moral courage. Men like Townshend and Percival, caught in a trap by a more enterprising enemy, sat zombie-like until disaster overwhelmed them. As a corrective, the author also mentions unequivocally great military and naval commanders like Napoleon, Wellington and Nelson who were far from this personality type.

Reception Even though some of the psychology theory may have dated, the work has attracted favourable reviews for over 40 years and is still considered a valuable text in studies of leadership. In January 2015, an annual list published by BookFinder revealed that it had been the most sought out-of-print book in the United States during the previous year.

Worked examples

Example 1 — a first encounter with On the Psychology of Military Incompetence

Start with the simplest possible case. Write down what On the Psychology of Military Incompetence claims or describes in one sentence, then invent the smallest concrete situation in which that sentence is true. In science, the smallest case is usually a single object, a single equation or a single measurement. Check that every symbol or term in your sentence has a meaning in that case.

Example 2 — changing one variable

Take the situation from Example 1 and change exactly one quantity: double it, halve it, or set it to zero. Predict what should happen to On the Psychology of Military Incompetence before you calculate. Comparing your prediction with the result is the fastest way to find out whether you understand the idea or only the words.

Example 3 — an exam-style question

Typical questions about On the Psychology of Military Incompetence ask you to (a) state it precisely, (b) apply it to given data, and (c) explain a limitation. Practise writing all three answers in under five minutes; the third part is what separates a full-mark answer from an average one.

Applications of On the Psychology of Military Incompetence

In research: On the Psychology of Military Incompetence appears in science research whenever the underlying quantities have to be modelled precisely. Papers usually cite it as a starting assumption and then explore where it breaks down.
In technology and industry: Engineering practice reuses On the Psychology of Military Incompetence in design rules, simulations and safety margins. Knowing the idea lets you read a specification sheet and understand why the numbers look the way they do.
In the classroom: On the Psychology of Military Incompetence is common in secondary-school and first-year university syllabi. It links to neighbouring topics 1976 non-fiction books, Books about military history, Jonathan Cape books, so understanding it makes those chapters shorter.
In everyday life: Look for On the Psychology of Military Incompetence outside the textbook — in sport, cooking, traffic, electronics or the sky above you. An example you found yourself is remembered far longer than one you were given.

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How to study On the Psychology of Military Incompetence in 20 minutes

Read the reference excerpt below once, without taking notes.
Close the page and write down what On the Psychology of Military Incompetence means in your own words.
Compare your version with the excerpt and mark what you missed.
Work through the three examples above with pen and paper.
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Frequently asked questions

What is On the Psychology of Military Incompetence in simple terms?

On The Psychology of Military Incompetence is a work by Norman F. Dixon, first published in 1976, which applies insights from psychology to military history.

Why does On the Psychology of Military Incompetence matter?

Because it connects several science ideas at once: it gives you a definition you can apply, a quantity you can calculate, and a way to check whether a result is plausible.

How should I study On the Psychology of Military Incompetence?

Read the excerpt, restate it from memory, then work through the examples and applications listed on this page. The five-step study plan above takes about twenty minutes.

What does this page cover?

It gives you a compact reference excerpt plus original lgStudy explanations, examples, applications and study material on On the Psychology of Military Incompetence.