Open individualism is a view within philosophy of self, according to which there exists only one numerically identical subject, who is everyone at all times; in the past, present and future. It is a theoretical solution to the question of personal identity, being contrasted with empty individualism, which is the view that one's personal identity corresponds to a fixed pattern that instantaneously disappears with the passage of time, and closed individualism, the common view that personal identities are particular to subjects and yet survive over time.
History The term was coined by Croatian-American philosopher Daniel Kolak, though a similar view has been described at least since the time of the Upanishads, in the late Bronze Age; the Upanishadic phrase Tat tvam asi ("You are that") is emblematic. Others who have expressed similar views (in various forms) include the philosophers Averroes, Arthur Schopenhauer (influenced by the Upanishads), and Arnold Zuboff (who calls his view universalism), mystic Meher Baba, stand-up comedian Bill Hicks, writer Alan Watts (explicitly elaborating on the Upanishads), as well as physicists Erwin Schrödinger, Freeman Dyson, and Fred Hoyle.
In fiction Leo Tolstoy's short story "Esarhaddon, King of Assyria" (1903), tells how an old man appears before Esarhaddon and takes the king through a process where he experiences, from a first-person perspective, the lives of humans and non-human animals he has tormented. This reveals to him that he is everyone and that by harming others, he is actually harming himself. In the science fiction novel October the First Is Too Late (1966), Fred Hoyle puts forward the "pigeon hole theory" which asserts that "each moment of time can be thought of as a pre-existing pigeon hole" and the pigeon hole currently being examined by your consciousness is the present and that the spotlight of consciousness does not have to move in a linear fashion; it could potentially move around in any order. Hoyle considers the possibility that there might be one set of pigeon holes for each person, but only one spotlight, which would mean that the "consciousness could be the same". One (1988), a novel by Richard Bach, features the author and his wife finding themselves under a spell of quantum physics, existing in different incarnations of themselves in alternate worlds. Eventually, they find out that all incarnations of themselves and others are the same being. "The Egg" (2009), a short story by Andy Weir, is about a character who finds out that they are every person who has ever existed.
In reality
According to open individualism, physicalism implies experience never dies, because there is no one to die. There is always a substructure embedded in the sum of all experiential computations which assimilates the past from the inside of its causal structure. Human intuitions are of hindrance here, because people don't think in this computational, physical way by biological instinct, and they come to stubbornly hold on to linear identities of fundamental characters. From this perspective reincarnation in the common sense isn't true, but rather it is that people are already reincarnated as everything because no one is traveling. This computation that knows "I am here" is the same subject as that computation over there in the future that knows "I am here", and there is no computation which knows "I am not here". The answer to the vertiginous question is that all experiences are "live", but the illusion of separateness caused by the physical brain and memories causes it to feel like, from each person's psychological perspective, that their experiences are the only ones live. Krista and Tatiana Hogan have a unique thalamic connection that may provide insight into the philosophical and neurological foundations of consciousness. It has been argued that there's no empirical test that can conclusively establish that for some sensations, the twins share one token experience rather than two exactly matching token experiences. Yet background considerations about the way the brain has specific locations for conscious contents, combined with the evident overlapping pathways in the twins' brains, arguably implies that the twins share some conscious experiences. If this is true, then the twins may offer a proof of concept for how experiences in general could be shared between brains.
In ethics Since open individualism fundamentally challenges a common view of the self, the outcome of the philosophy also suggests a radical change in how society views revenge, punishment, and in general any justification of suffering that is founded in our own alienation from the subject experiencing the suffering. From a utilitarian perspective it could be argued that killing wrongdoers is justified if it lowers the amount of suffering that the wrongdoer will have to experience in total. However sadistic punishment just for the sake of revenge doesn't make sense, according to open individualism, since it just causes more suffering for you to experience.
See also
References
Further reading Fasching, Wolfgang (2009-05-26). "The mineness of experience". Continental Philosophy Review. 42 (2): 131–148. doi:10.1007/s11007-009-9107-z. Kolak, Daniel (1999). In Search of Myself: Life, Death, and Personal Identity. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth. ISBN 9780534239282. Schrödinger, Erwin (1951). My View of the World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0521062244. {{cite book}}: ISBN / Date incompatibility (help) Zuboff, Arnold (December 2025). Finding Myself: Beyond the False Boundaries of Personal Identity (PDF). Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Vol. 49, Special Supplement. Charlottesville, VA: Philosophy Documentation Center. doi:10.5840/msp202549Supplement12. ISBN 9781634351171. Alternate link.
External links Quotations related to Open individualism at Wikiquote
