The public goods game is a standard of experimental economics. In the basic game, subjects secretly choose how many of their private tokens to put into a public pot. The payoff of each player is their "private consumption" (their endowment minus their contribution) plus their benefit from the "public good" (the sum of contributions multiplied by a factor). The game is used to study degree of altruism and cooperation between individuals.
Introduction Public goods games are fundamental in experimental economics. The nature of the experiment is incentives and the problem of free riding. Public goods games investigate the incentives of individuals who free-ride off individuals who are contributing to the common pool. A public goods game investigates behavioural economics and the actions of the players in the game. In this process, it seeks to use behavioural economics to understand the decisions of its players. It extends further to free-riding, which has far-reaching applications to environmental, managerial and social economics. Public goods games are valuable in understanding the role of incentives in an individual's behaviours. They arise from behavioural economics and have broad applications to societal challenges. Examples of applications include environmental policy, legal and justice issues and workplace and organisational structures.
Description of the game and result Consider a group of individuals consists of n identical individuals. Each individual is endowed with M tokens and must decide how many tokens to allocate to a public "pot" (public good). The payoff of each individual i is
π i = M − g i + a ∑ j = 1 n g j {\displaystyle \pi _{i}=M-g_{i}+a\sum _{j=1}^{n}g_{j}}
where g i {\displaystyle g_{i}} is the contribution of individual i to the public good, and therefore, M − g i {\displaystyle M-g_{i}} is her private consumption and a ∑ j = 1 n g j {\displaystyle a\sum _{j=1}^{n}g_{j}} is her benefit from the public good.
Optimum To find the optimal contribution we shall maximize the payoff of the representative individual:
M a x g ( M − g + a n g ) {\displaystyle {\underset {\ g}{\ Max}}(M-g+ang)}
The derivative with respect to g is − 1 + a n {\displaystyle -1+an} . Note that if a n > 1 {\displaystyle an>1} then the optimal contribution is M since the first derivative is positive.
Nash equilibrium If a < 1 {\displaystyle a<1} then given other individuals' contributions individual i maximizes her payoff by contributing 0. If she contributes 1 token her private consumption decreases by 1 and her benefit from public consumption increases by a < 1 {\displaystyle a<1} . Therefore, at the Nash equilibrium each individual contributes 0. The public good game is easily translated to a laboratory experiment. If individuals are purely egoistic then we will end up in no contributions. If individuals are pure altruistic then we will end up in individuals contributing their entire endowments. An experimental result between the two extremes, shows the degree of altruism (or egoism). In fact, the Nash equilibrium is rarely seen in experiments; people do tend to add something into the pot. The actual levels of contribution found varies widely (anywhere from 0% to 100% of initial endowment can be chipped in). The average contribution typically depends on the multiplication factor. Capraro has proposed a new solution concept for social dilemmas, based on the idea that players forecast if it is worth to act cooperatively and then they act cooperatively in a rate depending on the forecast. His model indeed predicts increasing level of cooperation as the multiplication factor increases. Depending on the experimental design, those who contribute below average or nothing are called "defectors" or "free riders", as opposed to the contributors or above-average contributors who are called "cooperators". We can take a deeper look at the public goods game. In fact, intergroup competition has a large effect on the public goods game. In Jonathan et al.'s experiment, they compared linear public goods games without comparison (PG), with comparison but without incentives to win (XPG), or with incentives to win (CPG). Throughout the experiment, they found that in one-shot games, competition increases cooperation with/out incentives, while in finitely repeated games, cooperation is sustained with incentives. Cooperation decreases (increases) in response to wins (losses). On a cognitive level, intergroup comparisons can enhance (diminish) the salience of the group (individual) objective – a common goal – and also how closely one identifies with the group. In turn, the more a rational individual "reasons for the team" i.e., behave as a component of a profile maximizing the group's objective, the more cooperation is expected. Linking monetary incentives to group success further enhances the salience of the group objective, and thus intra-group cooperation.
Variants
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