Punchscan is an optical scan vote counting system invented by cryptographer David Chaum. Punchscan is designed to offer integrity, privacy, and transparency. The system is voter-verifiable, provides an end-to-end (E2E) audit mechanism, and issues a ballot receipt to each voter. The system won grand prize at the 2007 University Voting Systems Competition. The computer software which Punchscan incorporates is open-source; the source code was released on 2 November 2006 under a revised BSD licence. However, Punchscan is software independent; it draws its security from cryptographic functions instead of relying on software security like DRE voting machines. For this reason, Punchscan can be run on closed source operating systems, like Microsoft Windows, and still maintain unconditional integrity. The Punchscan team, with additional contributors, has since developed Scantegrity.
Voting procedure
A Punchscan ballot has two layers of paper. On the top layer, the candidates are listed with a symbol or letter beside their name. Below the candidate list, there are a series of round holes in the top layer of the ballot. Inside the holes on the bottom layer, the corresponding symbols are printed. To cast a vote for a candidate, the voter must locate the hole with the symbol corresponding to the symbol beside the candidate's name. This hole is marked with a Bingo-style ink dauber, which is purposely larger than the hole. The voter then separates the ballot, chooses either the top or the bottom layer to keep as a receipt, and shreds the other layer. The receipt is scanned at the polling station for tabulation. The order of the symbols beside the candidate names is generated randomly for each ballot, and thus differs from ballot to ballot. Likewise for the order of the symbols in the holes. For this reason, the receipt does not contain enough information to determine which candidate the vote was cast for. If the top layer is kept, the order of the symbols through the holes is unknown. If the bottom layer is kept, the order of the symbols beside the candidates name is unknown. Therefore, the voter cannot prove to someone else how they voted, which prevents vote buying or voter intimidation.
Tabulation procedure As an example, consider a two candidate election between Coke and Pepsi, as illustrated in the preceding diagram. The order of the letters beside the candidates' names could be A and then B, or B and then A. We will call this ordering P 1 {\displaystyle P_{1}} , and let P 1 {\displaystyle P_{1}} =0 for the former ordering and P 1 {\displaystyle P_{1}} =1 for the latter. Therefore,
P 1 {\displaystyle P_{1}} : order of symbols beside candidate list,
P 1 ∈ { 0 , 1 } = { AB , BA } {\displaystyle P_{1}\in \{0,1\}=\{{\mbox{AB}},{\mbox{BA}}\}\,} . Likewise we can generalize for other parts of a ballot:
P 2 {\displaystyle P_{2}} : order of symbols through the holes,
P 2 ∈ { 0 , 1 } = { AB , BA } {\displaystyle P_{2}\in \{0,1\}=\{{\mbox{AB}},{\mbox{BA}}\}\,} .
P 3 {\displaystyle P_{3}} : which hole is marked,
P 3 ∈ { 0 , 1 } = { 1st , 2nd } {\displaystyle P_{3}\in \{0,1\}=\{{\mbox{1st}},{\mbox{2nd}}\}\,} .
R {\displaystyle R} : result of the ballot,
R ∈ { 0 , 1 } = { Coke , Pepsi } {\displaystyle R\in \{0,1\}=\{{\mbox{Coke}},{\mbox{Pepsi}}\}\,} . Note that the order of the candidates' names are fixed across all ballots. The result of a ballot can be calculated directly as,
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