This article provides a detailed chronological account of the historical reception and criticism of security and privacy features in the WhatsApp messaging service.
2011 On May 20, 2011, an unidentified security researcher from the Netherlands under the pseudonym "WhatsappHack" published a method to hijack WhatsApp accounts using a flaw in the authentication process, to the Dutch websites Tweakers.net and GeenStijl. The method involved trying to log in to a person's account from another phone number and intercepting the verification text message that would be sent out. "WhatsappHack" provided methods to accomplish this on both Symbian and Android operating systems. One day after the publication of the articles, WhatsApp issued a patch to both the Android and Symbian clients. In May 2011, another security hole was reported which left communication through WhatsApp susceptible to packet analysis. WhatsApp communications data was sent and received in plaintext, meaning messages could easily be read if packet traces were available.
2012 In May 2012 security researchers noticed that new updates of WhatsApp sent messages with encryption, but described the cryptographic method used as "broken." In August of the same year, the WhatsApp support staff stated that messages sent in the "latest version" of the WhatsApp software for iOS and Android (but not BlackBerry, Windows Phone, and Symbian) were encrypted, but did not specify the cryptographic method. On January 6, 2012, an unknown hacker published a website that made it possible to change the status of any WhatsApp user, so long as the phone number associated with the user's account was known. On January 9, WhatsApp reported that it had resolved the problem. In reality, WhatsApp's solution had been to block the website's IP address, which had allowed a Windows tool to be made that could accomplish the same thing. This problem has since been resolved by the institution of an IP address check on currently logged-in sessions. On September 14, 2012, Heise Security demonstrated how to use WhatsAPI to hijack any WhatsApp account. Shortly afterward, WhatsApp threatened to initiate legal action against the developers of WhatsAPI, an open source project, and WhatsAPI temporarily took down their source code. This, however, did not address the underlying security failure and Heise Security claimed they had been able to successfully repeat the hacking of WhatsApp accounts. The WhatsAPI team has since resumed active development.
2013–2015 On March 31, 2013, the Saudi Arabia Communications and Information Technology Commission (CITC) issued a statement that mentioned possible measures against WhatsApp, among other applications, unless the service providers took serious steps to comply with monitoring and privacy regulations. In February 2014, the Schleswig-Holstein Data Protection Authority advised against using WhatsApp, as the service lacked privacy protection such as end-to-end client-side encryption technology. In late 2014, WhatsApp began its implementation of end-to-end encryption, which it finished in April 2016. A joint Canadian-Dutch government investigation was launched into several concerns over WhatsApp's compliance with security regulations. The primary concern of the investigators was that WhatsApp required users to upload their mobile phone's entire address book, including contact information for contacts who were not using WhatsApp, to be mirrored on WhatsApp's servers. While WhatsApp stored these phone numbers in hash, the data was not salted. In late 2015, the Dutch government released a press statement claiming that WhatsApp had changed its hashing method, making it much harder to reverse, and thus subsequently complied with all rules and regulations. On December 1, 2014, Indrajeet Bhuyan and Saurav Kar demonstrated the WhatsApp Message Handler vulnerability, which allows anyone to remotely crash WhatsApp just by sending a specially crafted 2 kilobyte message. A user who receives the message must delete the whole conversation to avoid crashing WhatsApp upon opening the conversation. In early 2015, after WhatsApp launched a web client that can be used from the browser, Bhuyan found that the client had two new security issues: the WhatsApp photo privacy bug and the WhatsApp web photo sync bug.
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