STRAT-X

STRAT-X, or Strategic-Experimental, was a U.S. government-sponsored study conducted during 1966 and 1967 that comprehensively analyzed the potential future of the U.S. nuclear deterrent force. At the time, the Soviet Union was making significant strides in nuclear weapons delivery, and also constructing anti-ballistic missile defenses to protect strategic facilities. To address a potential technological gap between the two superpowers, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara entrusted the classified STRAT-X study to the Institute for Defense Analyses, which compiled a twenty-volume report in nine months. The report looked into more than one hundred different weapons systems, ultimately resulting in the MGM-134 Midgetman and LGM-118 Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Ohio-class submarines, and the Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles, among others. Journalists have regarded STRAT-X as a major influence on the course of U.S. nuclear policy.

Background In the mid-1960s, reports received by U.S. intelligence agencies indicated that the Soviets were planning to deploy large numbers of highly accurate and powerful intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Later, the R-36 ICBM entered service. Possessing the greatest throw weight of any ICBM ever at 8.8 tonnes (19,000 lb), the R-36 was larger than the most modern ICBMs in the U.S. arsenal at the time. Due to its size, it was able to carry high-yield warheads capable of destroying Minuteman hardened silos (see Counterforce). This was considered a significant risk to American ICBMs and, as a result, to the United States' nuclear defense strategy by reducing the United States' ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons if attacked. At the same time, the Soviets were designing and constructing increasingly sophisticated anti-ballistic missile defense systems to protect strategically important facilities around Moscow, reducing the threat posed by American ICBMs. These developments compelled the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, to commission a study to look into ways of improving the survivability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. According to Graham Spinardi in his book From Polaris to Trident (1994), STRAT-X was a response by the U.S. Department of Defense's Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Lloyd Wilson, to the U.S. Air Force; the service was demanding a large ICBM called the WS-120A. Spinardi suggests that STRAT-X was allowed to proceed so it could terminate the study for such a missile. Funding for the WS-120A would not be released by Secretary McNamara, and plans for such a missile were canceled in 1967.

Study The study was named "STRAT-X" in order not to reveal its intentions, and also to eliminate partiality towards sea-, air- or land-based systems. It was conducted by the Research and Engineering Support Division of the independent and non-profit Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), which had conducted a study in early 1966 titled "Pen-X", upon which STRAT-X was based. STRAT-X was chaired by President of the IDA, retired General Maxwell D. Taylor, while the institution's Fred Payne presided over STRAT-X's "working" panel. The panel also included executives from major independent corporations and defense contractors such as Boeing, Booz Allen Hamilton, Thiokol and TRW. The Advisory Committee members were mostly military officers, including U.S. Navy Rear Admirals George H. Miller and Levering Smith.

On 1 November 1966, McNamara signed an order authorizing STRAT-X, officially initiating the study. During STRAT-X, the working panel was "encouraged to examine system concepts unrestrained by considerations of potential management problems or political influences." The Secretary wanted new ideas about "path-breaking" weapons systems that were either offensive or defensive in nature, unhindered by defense bureaucracy, which had the potential to stifle innovation. Sea-, land- and air-based missile systems were investigated, but crewed bombers and orbital systems were not. The group was also asked to consider the cost effectiveness of all systems, as well to predict possible Soviet responses. To meet this requirement, a series of documents were written from the perspective of the Soviet Minister of Defense General Andrei Grechko, complete with anti-capitalistic statements and a prediction of the eventual triumph of socialism. In the end, a twenty-volume report covered no fewer than 125 different ideas for missile systems, nine of which were reviewed in great detail.

Findings and consequences

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