Security theater is the practice of implementing security measures that are considered to provide the feeling of improved security while doing little or nothing to achieve it. The term was originally coined by Bruce Schneier for his book Beyond Fear and has since been widely adopted by the media and the public, particularly in discussions surrounding the United States Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Practices criticized as security theater include airport security measures, stop-and-frisk policies on public transportation, and clear bag policies at sports venues.
Etymology The term security theater was coined by computer security specialist and writer Bruce Schneier for his book Beyond Fear, but has gained currency in security circles, particularly for describing airport security measures. Examples of use of the term:
For theater on a grand scale, you can't do better than the audience-participation dramas performed at airports, under the direction of the Transportation Security Administration. [...] The T.S.A.'s profession of outrage is nothing but 'security theater,' Mr. Schneier said, using the phrase he coined in 2003 to describe some of the agency's procedures. Airline passengers will be able to bring many types of cigarette lighters on board again starting next month after authorities found that a ban on the devices did little to make flying safer, a newspaper reported Friday. 'Taking lighters away is security theater,' Transportation Security Administration chief Kip Hawley told The (New York) Times in an interview.
Examples Some measures which have been called security theater include:
Airport security measures Many procedures of the TSA have been criticized as security theater. Specific measures critiqued as security theater include the "patting down the crotches of children, the elderly and even infants as part of the post-9/11 airport security show" and the use of full body scanners, which "are ineffective and can be easily manipulated." Many measures are put in place in reaction to past threats and "are ineffective at actually stopping terrorism, as potential attackers can simply change tactics."
The use of Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS) and its successor, Secure Flight – programs which rely on static screening of airline passenger profiles to choose which people should be searched – has been criticized as ineffective security theater. The TSA's Registered Traveler Program and Trusted Traveler Program have been criticized on similar grounds. CAPPS has been demonstrated to reduce the effectiveness of searching below that of random searches, since terrorists can test the system and use those who are searched least often for their operations. A 2010 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that the TSA's $900 million Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program, a behavioral-detection program introduced in 2007 that is aimed at detecting terrorists, had detected no terrorists and failed to detect at least 16 people who had traveled through airports where the program was in use and were later involved in terrorism cases. In 2013, a GAO report found that no evidence existed to support the idea that "behavioral indicators [...] can be used to identify persons who may pose a risk to aviation security." A separate 2013 report by the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General found that the TSA had failed to evaluate the SPOT program and could not "show that the program is cost effective." The SPOT program has been described as security theater.
With the aim of preventing individuals on the No Fly List from flying on commercial airliners, U.S. airports require all passengers to show valid picture ID (e.g. a passport or driver's license) along with their boarding pass before entering the boarding terminal. At this checkpoint, the name on the ID is matched to that on the boarding pass, but is not recorded. In order to be effective, this practice must assume that 1) the ticket was bought under the passenger's real name (at which point the name was recorded and checked against the No Fly List), 2) the boarding pass shown is real, and 3) the ID shown is real. However, the rise of print-at-home boarding passes, which can be easily forged, allows a potential attacker to buy a ticket under someone else's name, to go into the boarding terminal using a real ID and a fake boarding pass, and then to fly on the ticket that has someone else's name on it. Additionally, a 2007 investigation showed that obviously false IDs could be used when claiming a boarding pass and entering the departures terminal, so a person on the No Fly List can simply travel under a different name. Facial recognition technology was introduced at Manchester Airport in August 2008. A journalist for The Register claimed that "the gates in Manchester were throwing up so many false results that staff effectively turned them off." Previously matches had to be 80% the same to their passport pictures to go through, and this was quickly changed to 30%. According to Rob Jenkins, a facial recognition expert at Glasgow University, when testing similar machines at a 30% recognition level, the machines were unable to distinguish between the faces of Osama bin Laden and Winona Ryder, bin Laden and Kevin Spacey, nor between Gordon Brown and Mel Gibson.
Random search programs on public transit and sports venues Random bag searches on subway systems – a practice that has been used on the Washington Metro and on New York City mass transit – have been condemned as ineffective security theater and a waste of resources. Such programs have also been criticized by members of the public and civil liberties groups. After eighteen months of random bag checks by the Metro Transit Police from December 2010, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority reported that the program, which was funded by a federal homeland security grant, had yielded zero arrests. Similarly, the Chicago Transit Authority police's deployment of random explosive-residue-swabbing checkpoints at public transit stations has been criticized as an ineffective means of security. Pat-downs of fans entering arenas for National Football League and metal detectors at Major League Baseball games have also been criticized as security theater. Additionally, the effectiveness of Clear and Large Bag policies at many major sports venues in the United States has been questioned repeatedly.
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