The selectorate theory is a theory of government that studies the interactive relationships between political survival strategies and economic realities. It is first detailed in The Logic of Political Survival, authored by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita of New York University (NYU), Alastair Smith of NYU, Randolph M. Siverson of UC Davis, and James D. Morrow of the University of Michigan. In subsequent years the authors, especially Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, have extended the selectorate theory in various other policy areas through subsequent academic publishings and books. The theory is applicable to all types of organizations with leadership, including (among others) private corporations and non-state actors. The theory is known for its use of continuous variables to classify regimes by describing the ratios of coalitions within the total population. Regimes are classified on a spectrum of coalition size, as opposed to conventional, categorical labels (for example, the authors define conventional democracy as a large coalition regime and autocracy as a small coalition regime). The theory has been applied to a large range of topics including foreign aid, the choice of tax rates by incumbent political leaders, as well as medieval European history.
Postulates Bueno de Mesquita makes several assumptions in his theory:
Leaders want to hold on to power for as long as they can. Leaders require a sufficient number of supporters to have power. Laws, titles, and family lineage mean nothing if the leader doesn't have sufficient support. Supporters expect some sort of reward for their support and will abandon the leader if not satisfied.
Overview
In selectorate theory, three groups of people constrain leaders. These groups are the nominal selectorate, the real selectorate, and the winning coalition. The nominal selectorate, also referred to as the interchangeables, includes every person who has some say in choosing the leader (for example, in an American presidential election, this is all registered voters). The real selectorate, also referred to as the influentials, are those who really choose the leaders (for example, in an American presidential election, the people who cast a vote for one of the candidates). The winning coalition, also referred to as the essentials, are those whose support translates into victory (for example, in an American presidential election, those voters that get a candidate to 270 Electoral College votes). In other countries, leaders may stay in power with the support of much smaller numbers of people, such as senior figures in the security forces, and business oligarchs, in contemporary Russia. The fundamental premise in selectorate theory is that the primary goal of a leader - regardless of secondary policy concerns - is to remain in power. To remain in power, leaders must retain support from every member essential to the success of their winning coalition. When the winning coalition is small, as in autocracies, the leader will tend to use private goods to satisfy the coalition. When the winning coalition is large, as in democracies, the leader will tend to use public goods to satisfy the coalition. In The Dictator's Handbook, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith state five rules that leaders should use to stay in power:
The smaller the winning coalition, the fewer people to satisfy to remain in control. The larger the selectorate, the easier it is to replace dissenters in the winning coalition. Extract as much wealth as you can from the population without provoking a rebellion or an economic recession. Give your essential supporters just enough rewards to keep them loyal. The remaining funds are yours to spend at your discretion, but do not give your essential supporters extra rewards or they will grow too independent and become a threat.
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