In labour economics, Shapiro–Stiglitz theory of efficiency wages (or Shapiro–Stiglitz efficiency wage model) is an economic theory of wages and unemployment in labour market equilibrium. It provides a technical description of why wages are unlikely to fall and how involuntary unemployment appears. This theory was first developed by Carl Shapiro and Joseph Stiglitz.
Introduction When full employment is achieved, if a worker is sacked, he automatically finds his next job soon. In the circumstances, he does not need to exert his effort in his job, and thus full employment necessarily motivates a worker to shirk provided that he is happy with loafing on the job. Since shirking makes a firm's productivity decline, the firm needs to offer its workers higher wages to eliminate shirking. Then all firms try to eliminate shirking, which pushes up average wages and decreases employment. Hence nominal wages tend to display downward rigidity. In equilibrium, all firms pay the same wage above market clearing, and unemployment makes job loss costly, and so unemployment serves as a worker-discipline device. A jobless person cannot convince an employer that he works at a wage lower than the equilibrium wage, because the owner worries that shirking occurs after he is hired. As a result, his unemployment becomes involuntary.
No-shirking condition Suppose utility is a function of wages w and effort e like u ( w , e ) = w − e {\displaystyle u(w,e)=w-e} , and workers maximize the utility function with a discount rate r. Then let b be the probability per unit time that a worker is dismissed from his job, and now we introduce the expected lifetime utility V u {\displaystyle V_{u}} of an unemployed individual. Then we find the asset value of employment during a short interval [0, T]
V e = w T + e − r T [ b T V u + ( 1 − b T ) V e ] , {\displaystyle V_{e}=wT+e^{-rT}[bTV_{u}+(1-bT)V_{e}]\;,}
because the worker is either dismissed or kept employed during the time. The exponential function appears, because the occasion of dismiss in the interval is once and Poisson distribution is used for the discount rate. Due to the short interval, we approximate the exponential function by 1-rT
V e = w T + ( 1 − r T ) [ b T V u + ( 1 − b T ) V e ] , {\displaystyle V_{e}=wT+(1-rT)[bTV_{u}+(1-bT)V_{e}]\;,}
and simple calculation yields
V e = w T + b T V u − r b T 2 V u r T + b T − r b T 2 , {\displaystyle V_{e}={\frac {wT+bTV_{u}-rbT^{2}V_{u}}{rT+bT-rbT^{2}}}\;,}
lim t → 0 V e = w + b V u r + b . {\displaystyle \lim _{t\rightarrow 0}V_{e}={\frac {w+bV_{u}}{r+b}}\;.}
Then we find the fundamental asset equation of a worker:
r V e = w + b ( V u − V e ) . {\displaystyle rV_{e}=w+b(V_{u}-V_{e})\;.}
For a nonshirker the equation is
r V e , N = w − e + b ( V u − V e , N ) , {\displaystyle rV_{e,N}=w-e+b(V_{u}-V_{e,N})\;,}
and for a shirker
r V e , S = w + ( b + q ) ( V u − V e , S ) , {\displaystyle rV_{e,S}=w+(b+q)(V_{u}-V_{e,S})\;,}
where q is the probability per unit time that a worker is caught shirking and sacked. Then we see
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