The Signal Intelligence Regiment (German: Kommandeur der Nachrichtenaufklärung, lit. 'Commander of intelligence') (KONA) was the basic element of the field organisation of the German Army (Heer) signals intelligence organization (first called Inspectorate 7/VI, then LNA, and finally OKH/GdNA) during World War II. The KONA regiments were mobile communication reconnaissance units which were assigned to an army group and operated close to the front lines within the theatre of operations to intercept and build intelligence, via evaluation services (cryptanalysis) and disseminate the intelligence to senior staff locally and in the OKH/GdNA headquarters in the rear. To quote World War II cryptographic historian, Christos Triantafyllopoulos: "The KONA units did not have the ability to solve complicated Allied cryptosystems. Instead they focused on exploiting low/mid level ciphers and even in this capacity they were assisted by material sent to them by the central cryptanalytic department. This was the German Army High Command's Inspectorate 7/VI".
Sources The remains of Signal Intelligence Regiment 1 (abbr. KONA 1) surrendered to American troops near Tausing, located close to and northwest of Liezen, Austria on 9 May 1945. Commanded by the fanatical Nazi Major Ernst Hertzer, the remains of the regiment consisted of around 700 officers, enlisted men and women who were sent to the abbey at Stift Tepl, that was being used as a Prisoner of War enclosure. They had destroyed all their papers en route except those documents they considered the most important for reconstruction of their records. The remaining documents were kept in three briefcases plus a single book. On the afternoon of 9 May, with strong rumours of Soviets approaching the area, the three briefcases were burned with only the book remaining. The book remained in the unit vehicles after an extensive search and was never found. Between 23 May and 28 May 1945, over 350 prisoners were screened at a town called Konstantinsbad close to Plzeň in the Czech Republic. All primary personnel were interviewed, with a further 41 chosen for further questioning. Some reports were written at Plzeň but most Allied Target Intelligence Committee (abbr. TICOM) documents relating to KONA units were written between 30 May and 2 June at Oberursel near Frankfurt am Main. Further interrogations were undertaken and more specific information given when the group was moved to Revin. In total, the material created consisted of 31 reports supported with supplements giving information of the makeup and organization of Kommandeur der Nachrichtenaufklärung unit 1.
History KONA 1 operated in the southern sector of the Eastern Front from June 1941 until May 1945, intercepting and evaluating Red Army, Soviet Air Forces and People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) traffic. Certain personnel within KONA 1 appeared to have succeeded in reconstructing the detailed Order of Battle of the Soviet military, and in predicting the timing and location of Soviet offensives before they occurred The results were achieved by close integration of all sources of information as opposed to cryptanalysis of Soviet ciphers, although low and medium grade Soviet ciphers were read. The ratio of general evaluation against pure cryptanalysis was about three to one which was due to the following:
* Soviet High Grade ciphers were generally unreadable, due to the use of one-time pads. * A large amount of information could be obtained from Soviet military practices, movements of strategic reserves, chain of command, intentions to attack as well as including use of Indicators on ciphers, call-signs and a low standard of Soviet wireless discipline. From an examination of the cryptographical processes of Soviet security, KONA 1 appeared to have determined that one-time pads were used for high grade ciphers, and a number of code books and reciphering tables were used for medium and low grade ciphers. Medium and low grade ciphers appear to have been readable by KONA 1 in most cases. Captain Roman Roessler, Chief Evaluator of KONA 1, and commanding officer of the Intelligence Evaluation Centre (German: Nachrichten Aufklaerung Auswertungsstelle) (abbr. NASS) of the KONA regiment, stated that even if identification of individual formations wasn't possible, KONA was still successful in formulating a picture of groupings and number of formations. As regards the Soviet Rifle Corps and Divisions, KONA had to rely on other means to gather signal intelligence
Organization and Functions
KONA Regiment
The purpose of a KONA regiment was to supply intelligence to the staff of the Army Corps, Armies and Army Groups. Each KONA unit consisted of a Regimental Evaluation centre and possibly five or six intercept and intelligence companies. The KONA regiment operated with the signal intelligence platoons operating close to the front line, with its companies situated close to army headquarters (abbr. HQ) and the main evaluation unit situated in the rear at Army Group HQ. Close Range Signal Intelligence Companies (German: Nachrichten Nahaufklärungskompanie) (abbr. NANAK or NAK) were tasked with intercepting low level traffic. This was evaluated as it came in, with all intelligence passed to Senior Staff of their assigned Army Group as it became available, with all intercepts and immediate reports passed back to an evaluation platoon at company headquarters, for further evaluation. Long Range Signal Intelligence Companies (German: Nachrichten Fernaufklärungskompanie) (abbr. NAFAK or FAK) intercepted high level traffic, undertook some immediate evaluation which was passed to Senior Staff, and also passed back reports and intercepts to the regimental Signal Intelligence Evaluation Centre (German: Nachrichten-Aufklaerungs Auswertestelle) (abbr. NAAS). In 1944, the Signal Intelligence Battalion (German: Nachrichten Aufklaerung Abteilung) (abbr. NAA) was introduced into the organization of the KONA. These battalions were small administrative units, which acted to co-ordinate unit activities at Army level.
Signal Intelligence Evaluation Centre (NAAS)
The Signal Intelligence Evaluation Centre (German: Nachrichten-Aufklärungs Auswertestelle) (NAAS) centre was situated close to an Army Group HQ The NAAS functionality included evaluation and traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, collation and dissemination of intelligence. Four types of activity was included for the Evaluation and Traffic Analysis of intercepts:
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