The Singapore strategy was a naval defence policy of the United Kingdom that evolved in a series of war plans from 1919 to 1941. It aimed to deter aggression by Japan by providing a base for a fleet of the Royal Navy in the Far East, able to intercept and defeat a Japanese force heading south towards India or Australia. To be effective it required a well-equipped base. Singapore, at the eastern end of the Strait of Malacca, was chosen in 1919 as the location of this base; work continued on this naval base and its defences over the next two decades. The planners envisaged that a war with Japan would have three phases: while the garrison of Singapore defended the fortress, the fleet would make its way from home waters to Singapore, sally to relieve or recapture Hong Kong, and blockade the Japanese home islands to force Japan to accept terms. The idea of invading Japan was rejected as impractical, but British planners did not expect that the Japanese would willingly fight a decisive naval battle against the odds. Aware of the impact of a blockade on an island nation at the heart of a maritime empire, they felt that economic pressure would suffice. The Singapore strategy was the cornerstone of British Imperial defence policy in the Far East during the 1920s and 1930s. By 1937, according to Stephen Roskill, "the concept of the 'Main Fleet to Singapore' had, perhaps through constant repetition, assumed something of the inviolability of Holy Writ". A combination of financial, political and practical difficulties ensured that it could not be successfully implemented. During the 1930s, the strategy came under sustained criticism in Britain and abroad, particularly in Australia where the Singapore strategy was used as an excuse for parsimonious defence policies. The strategy ultimately led to the despatch of Force Z to Singapore and the sinking of the Prince of Wales and Repulse by Japanese air attack on 10 December 1941. The subsequent ignominious fall of Singapore was described by Winston Churchill as "the worst disaster and largest capitulation in British history".
Origins After the First World War, the Imperial German Navy's High Seas Fleet that had challenged the Royal Navy for supremacy was scuttled in Scapa Flow. However, the Royal Navy was already facing serious challenges to its position as the world's most powerful fleet from the United States Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy. The United States' determination to create what Admiral of the Navy George Dewey called "a navy second to none" presaged a new maritime arms race.
The U.S. Navy was smaller than the Royal Navy in 1919 but ships laid down under its wartime construction programme were still being launched and their more recent construction gave the American ships a technological advantage. The two-power standard of 1889 called for a Royal Navy strong enough to take on any two other powers. In 1909, this was reduced to a 60% superiority in dreadnoughts. Rising tensions over the U.S. Navy's building programme led to disputes between the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss and the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral William S. Benson in March and April 1919, although, as far back as 1909, the government directed that the United States was not to be regarded as a potential enemy. This decision was reaffirmed by Cabinet in August 1919 to preclude the U.S. Navy's building programme from becoming a justification for the Admiralty initiating one of its own. In 1920, the First Lord of the Admiralty Sir Walter Long announced a "one-power standard", under which the policy was to maintain a navy "not ... inferior in strength to the Navy of any other power". The one-power standard was promulgated at the 1921 Imperial Conference. The Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and the Dominions met at the 1921 Imperial Conference to determine a unified international policy, particularly the relationship with the United States and Japan. The most urgent issue was that of whether or not to renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which was due to expire on 13 July 1921. The Prime Minister of Australia Billy Hughes and the Prime Minister of New Zealand Bill Massey, strongly favoured its renewal. Neither wanted their countries to be caught up in a war between the United States and Japan and contrasted the generous assistance that Japan rendered during the First World War with the United States' disengagement from international affairs in its aftermath. "The British Empire", declared Hughes, "must have a reliable friend in the Pacific". They were opposed by the Prime Minister of Canada, Arthur Meighen, on the grounds that the alliance would adversely affect the relationship with the United States, which Canada depended upon for its security. No decision to renew was reached, and the alliance was allowed to expire. The Washington Naval Treaty in 1922 provided for a 5:5:3 ratio of capital ships of the British, United States and Japanese navies. Throughout the 1920s, the Royal Navy remained the world's largest navy, with a comfortable margin of superiority over Japan, which was regarded as the most likely adversary. The Washington Naval Treaty also prohibited the fortification of islands in the Pacific except for Singapore. The provisions of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 restricted naval construction, resulting in a serious decline in the British shipbuilding industry. German willingness to limit the size of its navy led to the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935. This was seen as signalling a sincere desire to avoid conflict with Britain. In 1934, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Ernle Chatfield, began to press for a new naval build-up sufficient to fight Japan and the strongest European power. He intended to accelerate construction to the maximum capacity of the shipyards but the Treasury soon became alarmed at the potential cost of the programme of £88 to £104 million. By 1938, the Treasury was losing its fight to stop rearmament; politicians and the public were more afraid of being caught unprepared for war with Germany and Japan than of a major financial crisis in the more distant future.
Plans
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