The "Statement on Chemical and Biological Defense Policies and Programs" was a speech delivered on November 25, 1969, by U.S. President Richard Nixon. In the speech, Nixon announced the end of the U.S. offensive biological weapons program and reaffirmed a no-first-use policy for chemical weapons. The statement excluded toxins, herbicides and riot-control agents as they were not chemical and biological weapons, though herbicides and riot-control agents were both later restricted. The decision to ban biological weapons was influenced by a number of domestic and international issues, including pressure from opposition to United States involvement in the Vietnam War, increased scrutiny of the programs' budgets, and a consensus that biological weapons were not effective or necessary, and had little strategic value compared to the vast US nuclear arsenal. The statement precipitated the 1975 US ratification of the Geneva Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention. The Soviet biological weapons program continued for the remainder of the Cold War. The US chemical weapons arsenal was maintained as a deterrent to Soviet chemical use, especially in a hypothetical European conflict with NATO.
Push for a U.S. ban
When Richard Nixon selected Melvin Laird as his Secretary of Defense in early 1969, Laird directed the Department of Defense to undertake a comprehensive review of U.S. biological warfare (BW) programs. Laird's push for a review of both the chemical and biological programs arose when Congress attempted to push the Pentagon for open, joint Congressional hearings on chemical-biological warfare (CBW). The Pentagon balked and the result was Laird's memorandum to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger urging a review of those weapons programs. Laird's memorandum to Kissinger expresses fear that the United States will be under "increasing fire" for the program and calls for the National Security Council to initiate a study. Laird hoped to eliminate the U.S. BW program. He saw two reasons to kill the BW program. The first was political—eliminating the program could deflect growing protests over Vietnam. The second was budgetary: As a U.S. Representative, Laird had watched Pentagon BW budgets balloon during the Kennedy and Johnson years. With Laird's impetus, and the concurrence of the National Security Council staff, in late May 1969 Kissinger directed key administration officials to begin a review of CBW "policies, programs and operational concepts" with a report to be issued no later than September. Surprisingly, Laird found the Joint Chiefs of Staff receptive to BW elimination as well. In twice weekly meetings with the Joint Chiefs during 1969 Laird found none of the officers opposed to ending the U.S. BW program. They found the weapons ineffective and militarily useless, especially when compared to the U.S. nuclear arsenal. The Joint Chiefs made two demands, one was to continue defensive germ warfare research and the other was that they be allowed to maintain the U.S. chemical arsenal as a deterrent to the Soviet Union, especially in the event of a European conflict with NATO. In June 1969 Kissinger asked a former Harvard colleague, Matthew Meselson to prepare a position paper on U.S. chemical and biological weapons programs. Meselson and Paul Doty then organized a private conference to discuss policy issues. The result was a September 1969 paper that not only urged U.S. ratification of the Geneva Protocol but an end to U.S. BW programs. Meselson and his colleagues argued that a biological attack would likely inflict a great toll on civilian populations while remaining largely militarily ineffective. Executive action on BW was followed by congressional action on chemical warfare (CW). In August 1969 the Senate passed an amendment to the Military Procurement Bill which unilaterally renounced first-use of chemical weapons. The Senate action also issued a moratorium on the acquisition of new chemical weapons as well as de-emphasizing the need for CW readiness. The bill passed 91–0, although some senators expressed reservations about the CW provisions. In 1969, the US also ceased its use of herbicides and riot-control agents in Indochina as part of the Vietnam War. These would later be restricted to an individual use approval basis in a 1975 executive order signed by president Gerald Ford.
Statement
Nixon issued his "Statement on Chemical and Biological Defense Policies and Programs" on November 25, 1969, in a speech from Fort Detrick. The same day he gave a speech from the Roosevelt Room at the White House further outlining his earlier statement. The statement ended, unconditionally, all U.S. offensive biological weapons programs. Nixon noted that biological weapons were unreliable and stated: The United States shall renounce the use of lethal biological agents and weapons, and all other methods of biological warfare. The United States will confine its biological research to defensive measures such as immunization and safety measures. In his speech Nixon called his move "unprecedented"; and it was in fact the first review of the U.S. BW program since 1954. Despite the lack of review, the BW program had increased in cost and size since 1961; when Nixon ended the program the budget was $300 million annually. Nixon's statement confined all biological weapons research to defensive-only and ordered the destruction of the existing U.S. biological arsenal. The Nixon statement also addressed the topics of chemical warfare and U.S. ratification of the Geneva Protocol, which, at the time, the nation had yet to ratify. On chemical warfare Nixon reaffirmed no-first-use of chemical weapons by the United States. He also announced that the United States would reconsider ratification of the Geneva Protocol, which Nixon recommended to the Senate that year.
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