The Technique for human error-rate prediction (THERP) is a technique that is used in the field of Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) to evaluate the probability of human error occurring throughout the completion of a task. From such an analysis (after calculating a probability of human error in a given task), some corrective measures could be taken to reduce the likelihood of errors occurring within a system. The overall goal of THERP is to apply and document probabilistic methodological analyses to increase safety during a given process. THERP is used in fields such as error identification, error quantification and error reduction.
Techniques THERP may refer to a number of techniques, which are split into one of two classifications: first-generation techniques and second-generation techniques. First-generation techniques are based on a simple dichotomy, or a dichotomous structure, of whether the technique fits an error situation in the related error identification and quantification of consideration. Second-generation techniques are more theoretical in their assessment and quantification of errors, addressing, rather, the schematic’s situational or interactive elements. HRA techniques are utilized for various applications in a range of disciplines and industries including healthcare, engineering, nuclear power, transportation, and business. THERP models human error probabilities (HEPs) using a fault-tree approach (similar to an engineering risk assessment), which integrate & account for performance-shaping factors that may influence these probabilities. The probabilities for the human reliability analysis event tree (HRAET), for example, are a calculative assessment tool drawn from a database developed by authors Alan D. Swain and H. E. Guttmann. Local data from simulations or accident reports may be used instead if supplemental data may deepen the examination of human-related error. The resultant tree portrays a step-by-step account of the stages involved in a task, in a logical order. The technique is known as a total methodology because it simultaneously manages many different activities, including task analysis, error identification, and representation in the form of HRAET and HEP quantification.
Background THERP is a first-generation methodology, which means that its procedures follow the way conventional reliability analysis models a machine. The technique was developed in the Sandia Laboratories for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Its primary author is Swain, who developed the THERP methodology gradually over a lengthy period. THERP relies on a large human reliability database that contains HEPs and is based upon both plant data and expert judgments. The technique was the first approach in HRA to come into broad use and is still widely used in a range of applications even beyond its original nuclear setting.
THERP methodology The methodology for the THERP technique is broken down into 5 main stages: 1. Define the system failures of interest These failures include functions of the system where human error has a greater likelihood of influencing the probability of a fault, and those of interest to the risk assessor; operations in which there may be no interest include those not operationally critical or those for which there already exist safety countermeasures. 2. List and analyse the related human operations, and identify human errors that can occur and relevant human error recovery modes This stage of the process necessitates a comprehensive task and human error analysis. The task analysis lists and sequences the discrete elements and information required by task operators. For each step of the task, possible errors are considered by the analyst and precisely defined. The possible errors are then considered by the analyst, for each task step. Such errors can be broken down into the following categories:
Errors of omission – leaving out a step of the task or the whole task itself Error of commission – this involves several different types of error: Errors of selection – error in use of controls or in issuing of commands Errors of sequence – required action is carried out in the wrong order Errors of timing – task is executed before or after when required Errors of quantity – inadequate amount or in excess The opportunity for error recovery must also be considered as this, if achieved, has the potential to drastically reduce error probability for a task. The tasks and associated outcomes are input to an HRAET in order to provide a graphical representation of a task’s procedure. The trees’ compatibility with conventional event-tree methodology i.e. including binary decision points at the end of each node, allows it to be evaluated mathematically. An event tree visually displays all events that occur within a system. It starts off with an initiating event, then branches develop as various consequences of the starting event. These are represented in a number of different paths, each associated with a probability of occurrence. As mentioned previously, the tree works on a binary logic, so each event either succeeds or fails. Below is an example of an event tree that represents a system fire:
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