A truth-bearer is an entity that is said to be either true or false and nothing else. The thesis that some things are true while others are false has led to different theories about the nature of these entities. Since there is divergence of opinion on the matter, the term truth-bearer is used to be neutral among the various theories. Truth-bearer candidates include propositions, sentences, sentence-tokens, statements, beliefs, thoughts, intuitions, utterances, and judgements but different authors exclude one or more of these, deny their existence, argue that they are true only in a derivative sense, assert or assume that the terms are synonymous, or seek to avoid addressing their distinction or do not clarify it.
Introduction Some distinctions and terminology as used in this article, based on Wolfram 1989 (Chapter 2 Section1) follow. It should be understood that the terminology described is not always used in the ways set out, and it is introduced solely for the purposes of discussion in this article. Use is made of the type–token and use–mention distinctions. Reflection on occurrences of numerals might be helpful. In grammar a sentence can be a declaration, an explanation, a question, a command. In logic a declarative sentence is considered to be a sentence that can be used to communicate truth. Some sentences which are grammatically declarative are not logically so. A character is a typographic character (printed or written) etc. A word-token is a pattern of characters. A word-type is an identical pattern of characters. A meaningful-word-token is a meaningful pattern of characters. Two word-tokens which mean the same are of the same word-meaning A sentence-token is a pattern of word-tokens. A meaningful-sentence-token is a meaningful sentence-token or a meaningful pattern of meaningful-word-tokens. Two sentence-tokens are of the same sentence-type if they are identical patterns of word-tokens characters A declarative-sentence-token is a sentence-token which that can be used to communicate truth or convey information. A meaningful-declarative-sentence-token is a meaningful declarative-sentence-token Two meaningful-declarative-sentence-tokens are of the same meaningful-declarative-sentence-type if they are identical patterns of word-tokens. A nonsense-declarative-sentence-token is a declarative-sentence-token which is not a meaningful-declarative-sentence-token. A meaningful-declarative-sentence-token-use occurs when and only when a meaningful-declarative-sentence-token is used declaratively. A referring-expression is expression that can be used to pick out or refer to particular entity. A referential success is a referring-expression's success in identifying a particular entity. A referential failure is a referring-expression's failure to identify a particular entity. A referentially-successful-meaningful-declarative-sentence-token-use is a meaningful-declarative-sentence-token-use containing no referring-expression that fails to identify a particular entity.
Sentences in natural languages As Aristotle pointed out, since some sentences are questions, commands, or meaningless, not all can be truth-bearers. If in the proposal "What makes the sentence Snow is white true is the fact that snow is white" it is assumed that sentences like Snow is white are truth-bearers, then it would be more clearly stated as "What makes the meaningful-declarative-sentence Snow is white true is the fact that snow is white". Theory 1a:
All and only meaningful-declarative-sentence-types are truth-bearers
Criticisms of theory 1a Some meaningful-declarative-sentence-types will be both truth and false, contrary to our definition of truth-bearer, for example, (i) in liar-paradox sentences such as "This sentence is false", (see Fisher 2008) (ii) and in time, place, and person-dependent sentences such as "It is noon", "This is London", and "I'm Spartacus". Anyone may ..ascribe truth and falsity to the deterministic propositional signs we here call utterances. But if he takes this line, he must, like Leibniz, recognise that truth cannot be an affair solely of actual utterances, since it makes sense to talk of the discovery of previously un-formulated truths. (Kneale, W&M (1962)) Revision to Theory 1a, by making a distinction between type and token. To escape the time, place and person dependent criticism the theory can be revised, making use or the type–token distinction, as follows Theory 1b:
All and only meaningful-declarative-sentence-tokens are truth-bearers
Quine argued that the primary truth-bearers are utterances
Having now recognised in a general way that what are true are sentences, we must turn to certain refinements. What are best seen as primarily true or false are not sentences but events of utterances. If a man utters the words 'It is raining' in the rain, or the words 'I am hungry' while hungry, his verbal performance counts as true. Obviously one utterance of a sentence may be true and another utterance of the same sentence be false.
Source: Quine 1970, page 13 Criticisms of theory 1b (i) Theory 1b prevents sentences which are meaningful-declarative-sentence-types from being truth-bearers. If all meaningful-declarative-sentence-types typographically identical to "The whole is greater than the part" are true then it surely follows that the meaningful-declarative-sentence-type "The whole is greater than the part" is true (just as all meaningful-declarative-sentence-tokens typographically identical to "The whole is greater than the part" are English entails the meaningful-declarative-sentence-types "The whole is greater than the part" is English) (ii) Some meaningful-declarative-sentences-tokens will be both truth and false, or neither, contrary to our definition of truth-bearer. E.g. A token, t, of the meaningful-declarative-sentence-type ‘P: I'm Spartacus’, written on a placard. The token t would be true when used by Spartacus, false when used by Bertrand Russell, neither true nor false when mentioned by Spartacus or when being neither used nor mentioned. Theory 1b.1
All meaningful-declarative-sentence-token-uses are truth-bearers; some meaningful-declarative-sentence-types are truth-bearers
To allow that at least some meaningful-declarative-sentence-types can be truth-bearers, Quine allowed so-called "eternal sentences" to be truth-bearers.
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