Unsafe at Any Speed: The Designed-In Dangers of the American Automobile is a non-fiction book by consumer advocate Ralph Nader, first published in 1965. Its central theme is that car manufacturers resisted the introduction of safety features (such as seat belts), and that they were generally reluctant to spend money on improving safety. The work contains substantial references and material from industry insiders. It was a best seller in non-fiction in 1966. The book resulted in the creation of the United States Department of Transportation in 1966 and the predecessor agencies of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in 1970.
Theme Unsafe at Any Speed's critique of the Chevrolet Corvair received widespread attention. It also dealt with the use of tires and tire pressure being based on comfort rather than on safety, and the automobile industry disregarding technically based criticism. A 1972 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration report disputed Nader's allegations about abnormal handling in sharp turns and suggested that the Corvair's rollover rate was comparable to similar cars.
Organization and content
Each of the book's chapters covers a different aspect of automotive safety:
"The Sporty Corvair"
The subject for which the book is probably most widely known, the rear-engined Chevrolet Corvair, is covered in Chapter 1 "The Sporty Corvair: The One-Car Accident". This relates to the first models (1960–1963) that had a swing axle suspension design which was prone to "tuck under" in certain circumstances. George Caramagna, a mechanic working on the suspension system, suggested installing a stabilizer (anti-roll or "anti-sway") bar, but was overruled by GM management. To make up for the cost-cutting lack of a front stabilizer bar, Corvairs required tire pressures which were outside of the tire manufacturers' recommended tolerances. The Corvair relied on an unusually high front to rear pressure differential (15 psi front, 26 psi rear, when cold; 18 psi and 30 psi hot), and if one inflated the tires equally, as was standard practice for all other cars at the time, the result was a dangerous oversteer. Despite proper tire pressures being more critical than for contemporaneous designs, Chevrolet salespeople and Corvair owners were not properly advised of the requirement and risk. According to the standards of the Tire and Rim Association, these recommended pressures caused the front tires to be overloaded whenever there were two or more passengers in the car. An unadvertised at-cost option (#696) included upgraded springs and dampers, front anti-roll bars and rear-axle-rebound straps to prevent tuck-under. Aftermarket kits were also available, such as the EMPI Camber Compensator, for the knowledgeable owner. The suspension was modified for 1964 models, with inclusion of a standard front anti-roll bar and a transverse-mounted rear spring. In 1965, the totally redesigned four-link, fully independent rear suspension maintained a constant camber angle at the wheels. A redesign for the 1965 model eliminated the tuck-under crash tendency.
"Disaster deferred"
Chapter 2 levels criticism on auto design elements such as instrument panels and dashboards that were often brightly finished with chrome and glossy enamels which could reflect sunlight or the headlights of oncoming motor vehicles into the driver's eyes. This problem, according to Nader, was well known to persons in the industry, but little was done to correct it.
Nader also offered advice about the gear shift quadrants on earlier cars fitted with automatic transmissions. Several examples are given of people being run over, or cars becoming runaways because drivers were not familiar with the shift pattern, causing them to shift into reverse when intending to shift to low gear, or vice versa. Nader made an appeal to the auto industry to standardize gearshift patterns as a safety issue. Early automatic transmissions, including GM's Hydra-Matic, Packard's Ultramatic, and Borg Warner's automatic used by a number of independent manufacturers (Rambler, Studebaker) used a pattern of "P N D L R", which put Reverse at the bottom of the quadrant, next to Low. Because it was difficult to tell by feel whether the lever was in "Low" or in "Reverse", drivers intending to select "Reverse" would frequently fail to move the lever far enough and shoot forwards. Alternately, drivers intending to select "Low" sometimes moved it too far into "Reverse" when intending to move forwards, and the car could ram into walls or buildings, damaging property and/or injuring people. In addition, other manufacturers, such as Chrysler, used a push-button selector to choose gear ranges. Chevrolet's Powerglide, as used on the Corvair, used a "R N D L" pattern, which separated the Reverse from the Drive gears by Neutral in the ideal way, but which had no "P" selection, only providing a parking brake. Ford was the first to use the "P R N D L" pattern, which also separated Reverse from forward ranges by Neutral. Eventually, this pattern became the standard for all automatic-shift cars. Chapter 2 also exposes workmanship problems and companies' failure to honor warranties.
"The second collision" Chapter 3 documents the history of crash science focusing on the effect on the human body (the second collision) as it collides with the interior of the car as the car hits another object (the first collision). Nader says that much knowledge was available to designers by the early 1960s but it was largely ignored within the American automotive industry. There are in-depth discussions about the steering assembly, instrument panel, windshield, passenger restraint, and the passenger compartment (which included everything from door strength to roll-over bars). Due to this, the "Nader bolt" was installed to reinforce doors.
"The power to pollute" Chapter 4 documents the automobile's impact on air pollution and its contribution to smog, with a particular focus on Los Angeles.
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