Words of estimative probability (WEP or WEPs) are terms used by intelligence analysts in the production of analytic reports to convey the likelihood of a future event occurring. A well-chosen WEP gives a decision maker a clear and unambiguous estimate upon which to base a decision. Ineffective WEPs are vague or misleading about the likelihood of an event. An ineffective WEP places the decision maker in the role of the analyst, increasing the likelihood of poor or snap decision making. Some intelligence and policy failures appear to be related to the imprecise use of estimative words.
History
Intelligence In 1964 Sherman Kent, one of the first contributors to a formal discipline of intelligence analysis addressed the problem of misleading expressions of odds in National Intelligence Estimates (NIE). In Words of Estimative Probability, Kent distinguished between "poets" (those preferring wordy probabilistic statements) from "mathematicians" (those preferring quantitative odds). To bridge the gap between them and decision makers, Kent developed a paradigm relating estimative terms to odds. His goal was to "set forth the community's findings in such a way as to make clear to the reader what is certain knowledge and what is reasoned judgment, and within this large realm of judgment what varying degrees of certitude lie behind each key judgment". Kent's initiative was not adopted, although the idea was well received and remains compelling today.
Policy and intelligence failures related to WEPs An example of the damage that missing or vague WEPs can do is to be found in the President's Daily Brief (PDB), entitled Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US. The President's Daily Brief is arguably the pinnacle of concise, relevant, actionable analytic writing in the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). The PDB is intended to keep the president informed on a wide range of issues, the best analysts write it and senior leaders review it. This, the "August 6 PDB", is at the center of much controversy for the USIC. The August 6 PDB began with not only a vague warning in the title, but also continued with vague warnings:
"Bin Ladin since 1997 has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in the US" (CIA, 2001, para. 1) "Bin Ladin implied...that his followers would 'bring the fighting to America'" (CIA, 2001, para. 1) Bin Ladin’s “attacks against ... US embassies ... in 1998 demonstrate that he prepares operations years in advance and is not deterred by setbacks" (CIA, 2001, para. 6) "FBI information ... indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks" (CIA, 2001, para. 10) "a call to [the US] Embassy in the UAE in May [said] that a group of Bin Ladin supporters was in the US planning attacks with explosives" (CIA, 2001, para. 11)
The PDB described Bin Laden's previous activities. It did not present the president with a critically important clear estimate of Bin Laden's likely activities in the coming months:
Bush had specifically asked for an intelligence analysis of possible al Qaeda attacks within the United States, because most of the information presented to him over the summer about al Qaeda focused on threats against U.S. targets overseas, sources said. But one source said the White House was disappointed because the analysis lacked focus and did not present fresh intelligence.
The lack of appropriate WEPs would lead to confusion about the likelihood of an attack and to guessing about the period in which it was likely to occur:
The language used in the memo lacks words of estimative probability that reduce uncertainty, thus preventing the President and his decisionmakers from implementing measures directed at stopping al Qaeda’s actions.
The consequences of the 9/11 and the Iraq/WMD intelligence failures, the 9/11 Commission and the Iraq Intelligence Commission, were the movers of structural reform of the intelligence community. Although these reforms intended to improve the functioning of the IC, particularly concerning inter-agency cooperation and information sharing, "they paid scant attention to improving the quality of analyses and intelligence writing". There is a pervasive feeling that this improvement is needed. However, there seems to be resistance in the IC, due in part to habit and in part to the reality of politics and the understandable preference for the "plausible deniability" that less precise jargon offers.
Medicine Physicians and clinical scientists face a very similar problem in obtaining informed consent for patients, where words such as "rare" or "infrequent" do have actual probabilities defined. Numerical information of this type, however, is rarely presented to patients. A representative guide for obtaining informed consent from people participating in social science or behavioural research, or of the potential risks of a medical procedure, suggests giving typical numerical chances of an adverse event when words of estimative probability first are used.
The guideline continues:
For studies involving investigational agents, or experimental doses or combinations of drugs and/or treatments, subjects should be warned that there may be as yet unknown risks associated with the drug/treatment but that they will be advised if any new information becomes available that may affect their desire to participate in the study.
Reforms to methodology Estimative statements can be improved in four ways; either by:
Adding quantitative source reliability and confidence measures to estimative statements Complementing estimative statements with stochastic analyses Standardizing WEPs Standardizing WEPs and complementing estimative statements with ratings of source reliability and analytic confidence
Quantification of source reliability and analytic confidence Michael Schrage, an advisor to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's (MIT) Security Studies Program, wrote in a Washington Post editorial that requiring analysts to produce and include quantitative measures of source reliability and confidence along with their findings would reduce ambiguity. Yet Schrage also reported that former interim Director of Central Intelligence John E. McLaughlin's attempted to enact this at the CIA, but, like Kent's initiative, it was not adopted:
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